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PROPOSED REVISIONS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S
SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW
BARRY NAKELLt'
In January 1973, the North Carolina General Assembly received
the Legislative Program and Report of the Criminal Code
Commission,1 a proposal prepared by a twenty-six member commission
appointed in November 1970 by the Attorney General pursuant to a
joint resolution of the General Assembly.' The Commission's legisla-
tive program deals comprehensively with criminal procedure in a pro-
posed new Chapter 15A of the General Statutes. The proposal is now
pending in the House of Representatives as House Bill No. 256 and in
the Senate as Senate Bill No. 207. The purpose of this article is to
discuss its search and seizure provisions.
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Ten years before Mapp v. Ohio,' North Carolina enacted 2 the ex-
clusionary rule as a means of enforcing the fourth amendment. At that
time, the United States Supreme Court had held that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applied to the
states:' but had applied the exclusionary rule only to federal officers.'
The North Carolina statute thus reflected a state policy that the most
effective acceptable procedure for ensuring freedom from unwarranted
official invasions of privacy was to deprive the prosecution of the use
in evidence of the fruits of illegal searches. This procedure withdrew
tAssociate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. This article was
prepared in cooperation with the North Carolina Law Center and with the assistance of Joseph
H. Stallings, second year student at the University of North Carolina School of Law.
I.CRIMINAL CODE COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM AND REPORT TO THE GENERAL As-
SEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1973). Hereafter, the Legislative Program will be cited by its
proposed section numbers, as "Proposed § _." The Report will be cited by page number, as
"COMMENTS _."
ii.Joint Resolution 24, 1971 N.C. General Assembly.
'367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21n 1937, the North Carolina legislature adopted an exclusionary rule for searches conducted
on the basis of an illegal search warrant. Ch. 339, [1937] N.C. Sess. Laws 670. In 1951, the statute
was amended to apply the exclusionary rule also to searches unlawfully conducted without a
warrant. Ch. 644, [1951] N.C. Sess. Laws 601. See STANSBURY'S NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§ 121, at 365 (Brandis rev. 1973). The North Carolina Supreme Court had earlier declined to adopt
an exclusionary rule judicially. State v. Fowler, 172 N.C. 905, 913-14, 90 S.E. 408, 411-12 (1916).
3Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949).
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from police officers the incentive to engage in such conduct for the
purpose of discovering evidence. Thereafter, the United States Supreme
Court held that the exclusionary rule applied as a matter of constitu-
tional imperative to all the states.' The Court imposed that universal
mandate to protect judicial integrity6 as well as to deter unlawful police
conduct. 7 North Carolina's statute was amended in 1969 and now pro-
vides as follows:
(a) No evidence obtained or facts discovered by means of an
illegal search shall be competent as evidence in any trial.
(b) No search may be regarded as illegal solely because of tech-
nical deviations in a search warrant from requirements not constitu-
tionally required
The practical justification for the exclusionary rule is that it repre-
sents the only institutional sanction for fourth amendment violations
that has any significant impact on law enforcement practices. Because
it withholds trustworthy physical evidence, it has never been heralded
as a judicial ideal, although it does in addition represent responsible
action by the courts to isolate their own processes from corrupt police
conduct. At the same time, it has not been regarded as a foolproof
antidote to illegal searches; it is just better than any other sanction that
we have been willing to impose on our criminal justice system.'
The basic objective of the exclusionary rule is to impress upon law
enforcement officers that illegal searches are not in their professional
interest since they cannot yield judicially acceptable information. Em-
pirical studies testing the validity of the exclusionary rule in light of that
objective have proven inconclusive.'0 This is not surprising due to the
difficulties in measuring the non-occurrence of undesirable activity and
'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'Id. at 659. See also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470, 484 (1928) (Holmes &
Brandeis, JJ., dissenting).
7367 U.S. at 647-57.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (Supp. 1971).
'"The ract that there is little agreement and little evidence that the exclusionary rule does deter
police lawlessness is much less significant, I think, than the fact that there is much agreement and
much evidence that all other existing alternatives do not." Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years
Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1150 (1959).
See also Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct By the Police, 52 J. CRIm. L. & P.S.
255, 260 (1961).
"Katz, The Supreme Court and the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina,
the Model, the Study and the Implications, 45 N.C.L. Rav. 119, 131-51 (1966): Oaks, Studyhing
the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 667, 678-709 (1970).
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the lack of pre-Mapp data indicating the frequency of illegal searches
and seizures. A 1966 survey of North Carolina police chiefs, sheriffs,
prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys, and trial judges, however,
showed that about three-fourths of those responding believed that the
exclusionary rule is an effective way of reducing the number of illegal
searches."
The exclusionary rule has spawned a variety of collateral benefits.
Perhaps paramount among them is that it provides the courts a means
for establishing guidelines for police investigative methods. Since the
courts before Mapp seldom had occasion to review the legality of police
searches, they were unable to refine sufficiently the constitutional prohi-
bition against "unreasonable searches and seizures." Although the
guidelines being promulgated are occasionally unclear or fluctuating,
they do enable police officers to know the limits of their authority with
more exactitude than could be derived from the necessarily broad lan-
guage of the fourth amendment itself.
Another byproduct of the exclusionary rule is greater law enforce-
ment and public awareness of the requirements of the fourth amend-
ment and, perhaps, even of the privacy policies behind them. Undoubt-
edly the trend toward greater professionalism in police departments-
including higher personnel education and other selection requirements,
more widespread training programs, and increased employment of
police legal advisors-was prompted by the need to conform to con-
stitutionally enforced investigative limitations.
2
The exclusionary rule does, however, contain weaknesses. It has an
impact only on police conduct that is primarily aimed at uncovering
evidence." If other objectives such as harassment, destruction of con-
traband, or accumulation of intelligence motivate the police, the exclu-
sionary rule will not deter their conduct. Moreover, the primary effect
of the exclusionary rule is to provide a windfall defense to the defendant
whether he is innocent or guilty. It cannot be called upon to provide
redress for the victim-whether in fact innocent or guilty-of an illegal
search that bears no fruit. 4
"Katz, supra note 10, at 134-35. See also Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally
Sei:zed Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 283.
'1-Kamisar, supra note 9, at 1158; Nagel, supra note 11, at 287; Paulsen, supra note 9, at 262.
" See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 413, 417-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
"See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 417-18 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
1973]
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Fairness in evaluating the exclusionary rule suggests the import-
ance of distinguishing results that flow from the fourth amendment
standards themselves from those that flow only from the exclusionary
remedy. The fourth amendment itself places some evidence beyond the
reach of law enforcement officers. If by violating search and seizure law
the officers should acquire that evidence, forbidding its use at trial does
no more than the fourth amendment contemplates. To that extent at
least, the fourth amendment does expressly contain an exclusionary
rule; it would exclude some evidence from trial by excluding it from the
possession of prosecutorial authorities.'" The exclusionary rule cannot
be billed for the loss of such evidence. That loss is the cost contemplated
by the fourth amendment as the price of privacy. The ledger for the
exclusionary rule should reflect only the lost evidence that the fourth
amendment would have allowed the police officers if they had postponed
their search until their investigation had developed probable cause or
until they had obtained a valid warrant. Even then, the cost due to the
exclusionary rule cannot be determined because the suppression cases
have not been audited to distinguish between those that would never
have arisen had the fourth amendment been obeyed in the first place and
those that would have survived if fourth amendment procedures had
been followed. Similarly, the audit should take into consideration
whether the prosecution of the particular case was defeated as a result
of suppression of the illegally obtained evidence or whether, although
weakened, it was nevertheless pursued to conviction on the basis of
untainted evidence.
A final weakness often attributed to the exclusionary rule is that it
does not punish the offending law enforcement officer."' The design of
the rule is not, however, that each police officer should individually have
the fruits of a search conducted by him suppressed in a succession of
sSee Loewy, The Warren Court as Defender of State and Federal Criminal Laws: A Reply
to Those Who Believe that the Court Is Oblivious to the Needs of Law Enforcetnent, 37 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 1218, 1236 (1969):
If the police had not 'blundered,' by committing the unreasonable search, the criminal
never would have been brought to trial in the first place since there would have been no
evidence to justify it. Therefore, in these instances the criminal does not go free because
the constable had blundered, but because he would have gone free if the constable had
not blundered.
'"See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971). Chief Justice Burger
explained in the couse of that opinion that "Policemen do not have the time, inclination, or training
to read and grasp the nuances of the appellate opinions that ultimately define the standards of
conduct they are to follow." Id. at 417. If that criticism of the police is true, it sounds more like
an argument against having any fourth amendment standards than against the exclusionary rule.
[Vol. 52
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
cases, each involving a violation of a different constitutional limitation,
until finally he is familiar with fourth amendment law. Instead, the
exclusionary rule is fashioned to provide police departments and police
officers with an incentive to adhere to the dictates of the Constitution
and thus encourages them to take personnel and educational measures
to assure compliance.' 7 The educated police cadet studying summaries
of fourth amendment decisions and the police sergeant or legal advisor
explaining recent rulings at roll call are the enforcement mechanisms
created around the exclusionary rule (together with the incentive af-
forded by the threat of losing the use of needed evidence unless it is
properly obtained). As experience under the infant exclusionary rule
accumulates in the states, a commitment to lawful investigative proce-
dures will be nurtured so that the cost to society in terms of lost prosecu-
tions will be reduced to tolerable proportions-if, as we do not know,
they are now any higher.
(1) The Scope of the Rule
The Commission has proposed replacing the existing exclusionary
rule in North Carolina with the following statute:"
Upon timely motion, evidence'" must be suppressed if:
"7See Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 16 (1964): "That
improvements are possible, and that preventive measures are feasible, is suggested by the perform-
ance of some of the federal agencies, notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has a
remarkable record as to the incidence of suppression of evidence secured by its agents."
"Proposed § 15A-974. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure provides, "A motion
to suppress evidence shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is based
was substantial, or if otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or of this State."
ALl MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 290.2(2) (Official Draft No. 1, 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]. It then defines "substantial" in terms of the same factors as
the Commission's proposal, adding two more:
(0 whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered;
and (g) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to support
his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized are sought
to be offered in evidence against him.
Id.
'9Proposed § 15A-971 defines "evidence" as "any tangible property or potential testimony
which may be offered in evidence in a criminal action." The Comments to § 15A-974 explain that
the "definition of 'evidence' set out in proposed § 15A-971 is very broad, but it may not include
'fruits of the poisonous tree' unless there is a constitutional requirement that such derivative
evidence be excluded." COMMENTS 238-39. The Commission's uncertainty as to the meaning of its
own draft, reflected in its statement "it may not include," is puzzling. A fair reading of the
definition of "evidence" in proposed § 15A-971 would give no indication of any intention to make
any provision regarding "fruits of the poisonous tree." The appropriate place for the legislation to
provide one way or the other in that respect would be in the exclusionary rule of § 15A-974. As
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(1) Its exclusion is required by the Constitution of the United States
or the Constitution of the State of North Carolina; or
(2) It is obtained as a result of a substantial violation of the provi-
sions of this Chapter. In determining whether a violation is substantial,
the court must consider all the circumstances including:
a. The importance of the particular interest violated;
b. The extent of the deviation from lawful conduct;
c. The extent to which the violation was wilful;
d. The extent to which exclusion will tend to deter future viola-
tions of this Chapter.
This proposal recommends two departures from present law. The
first departure is an abandonment of the automatic suppression of evi-
dence if it is found to have been acquired in an unconstitutional search.
Instead, such illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed only if
"authoritative case law"' " declares that suppression is the appropriate
sanction. The Comments explain: "There are indications that the
Burger Court will moderate some of the exclusionary rules, and this
section is designed not to freeze North Carolina's statutory law into
patterns set solely by current case law. '22 Thus, the Commission did not
suggest how it would "moderate some of the exclusionary rules" in
regard to constitutional violations. Instead it recommended that North
Carolina write its law reflexively to incorporate any Supreme Court
restrictions on the scope of the exclusionary rule. Since North Caro-
lina's exclusionary rule is not a creature of the United States Supreme
Court but of our own legislature, it would seem incumbent upon the
Commission to provide some reasons for changing a state policy that
has prevailed since 1951. But in this respect the Commission's report is
disappointing since not a single reason is offered in its report.
The Commission is not so coy in proposing moderations for the
exclusionary rule when it is applied to non-constitutional state law viola-
tions in the procuring of evidence. This is the second departure from
present law recommended by this section. The present statute excepts
from the exclusionary rule "technical deviations in a search warrant."
The proposed statute would except violations of statute that are not
"substantial" and lists four criteria to be used in making that determina-
tion.
discussed in the text, that section is drafted with sufficient flexibility to contract the exclusionary
rule accordingly if the Constitution is interpreted to narrow the "fruit of the poisonous tree"





The Commission's proposed moderations of the rule were ob-
viously inspired by Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents. 22 The major part of that opinion advo-
cated an alternative to the exclusionary rule, namely, workable machi-
nery for private damage actions against the governmental agency re-
sponsible for an offending police officer. 3 The Chief Justice acknowl-
edged that "private damage actions against individual police officers
concededly have not adequately met this requirement .. ". . I' He as-
cribed their failure to the reluctance of juries in most cases to return
verdicts against individual officers and to the difficulty of finding non-
exempt assets of an officer from which a judgment can be satisfied.2" A
third deficiency of the private damage action is that it imposes the
burden and the expense of enforcing fourth amendment law on the
private citizen. The plaintiff does not have a right to appointed counsel,
and his recoupment of costs is contingent on victory. The private dam-
age action provides a remedy only when an illegal search invades the
privacy of a person who has the initiative, resources, time, and courage
to pursue the hardships of litigation.
Chief Justice Burger recommended that the federal government
and the states "develop an administrative or quasi-judicial remedy
against the government itself"'2 rather than the individual police officer,
waive sovereign immunity 7 for that purpose, and replace jurors with
=403 U.S. 388, 413-27 (1971). See also Burger, supra note 17.
1'The Chief Justice reasoned that "If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern for
ollicial observance of the law does not require adherence to the exclusionary rule." 403 U.S. at
414. The validity of this conclusion would seem to depend on two questions: first. whether the
imperative of judicial integrity rationale would require the exclusionary rule even if the deterrence
rationale did not, and, second, whether the alternative remedy provided a level of deterrence
equivalent to that provided by the exclusionary rule. See Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1561-63 (1972); Paulsen, supra note 9, at 257-
59: cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
21403 U.S. at 421. See also UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT, THE POLICE 31-32 (1967); Foote,
Tort Rentediesfor Police Violation of individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 483,499 (1955); Nagel,
supra note II. at 302-05; Paulsen, supra note 9, at 260-61; Symposium-Police Tort Liability, 16
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 415, 432 (1967).
21403 U.S. at 421-22.
21ld. at 422-23. But see Paulsen, supra note 9, at 261: "Imposing liability on government units
...will not completely deter the state from engaging in unconstitutional practices. It may be very
attractive for state officials acting according to a calculus of police values, to violate now and pay
later."
"See Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibility for Unconstitutional Conduct: The Aftermath of
Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C.L. REV. 548, 558-71, 579-602 (1972).
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professional decision-makers.2? Perhaps a jurisdiction considering such
a~remedy might include a workable procedure for the government to
assume its prosecutorial responsibilities in such a case.
The Commission chose not to follow Chief Justice Burger's sugges-
tion? Rather, it took its cue from a secondary position that the Chief
Justice indicated he was willing to take without waiting for legislative
proliferation of his remedial scheme. "Independent of the alternative
embraced in this dissenting opinion," he wrote, "I believe the time has
come to re-examine the scope of the exclusionary rule and consider at
least some narrowing of its thrust so as to eliminate the anomalies it
has produced. 1  In an appendix to his opinion, the Chief Justice hinted
at some substance to this oblique statement by noting as "interesting"'"
a proposal by the American Law Institute32 to limit application of the
exclusionary rule to "substantial" violations of the Constitution. 3 The
Commission acknowledged that it relied on the American Law Institute
draft in preparing its proposal.3 4
It is premature for any predictions that the Supreme Court as
presently constituted will tinker with the scope of the exclusionary rule.
The present members of the Court who participated in the decision in
Mapp, Justices Douglas, Brennan and Stewart, all joined in the prevail-
ing opinion and have never officially waivered from that position.
Among the other sitting members of the Court, Justices White and
Marshall have always adhered to the exclusionary rule without com-
plaint about its nature or scope. Thus a majority of the present Court
has not publicly indicated any dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule.
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger gave clear expression to
his contrary views in Bivens. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent
in Bivens without addressing the exclusionary rule or the Chief Justice's
opinion.3" That same day, the Court decided Coolidge v. New
Hampshire,3 and Justice Blackmun noted in that case that he joined
?'403 U.S. at 422-24.
-"ln the case of violations of its'chapter on electronic eavesdropping the Commission recom-
mended "liquidated damages computed at the rate of one hundred dollars ($ 100.00) a day for every
day of violation or one thousand dollars ($1000.00), whichever is higher" as well as punitive
damages, attorneys' fees and costs. Proposed § 15A-299.
'1403 U.S. at 424.
3'Id.
2ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 23-24 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1971).
11403 U.S. at 424-26.
=COMMENTS 238-39; see note 18 supra.
5403 U.S. at 430.
-403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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in that portion of a dissenting opinion written by Justice Black "which
is to the effect that the Fourth Amendment supports no exclusionary
rule." 7 Justice Black, who concurred specially in Mapp and who is no
longer on the Court, argued in dissent that the fourth amendment con-
tains no exclusionary rule, but that the exclusionary rule inherent in the
fifth amendment might operate to require the exclusion from evidence
of some information obtained in an illegal search.38 Justice Harlan,
who also is no longer on the Court, wrote a concurring opinion in
Coolidge to explain that he believed the exclusionary rule for the fruits
of an illegal search should be applied only if the search "could be said
to offend those values which are 'at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 1" This reasoning distinguishes between the standards that
should be applied for the exclusion of evidence in federal cases and those
to be applied in state cases, presumably because federal cases are gov-
erned directly by the fourth amendment, while state cases are governed
in his opinion only by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
More recently, in a concurring opinion in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte written by Justice Powell, and joined in by Justice Rehnqu-
ist as well as Chief Justice Burger, the two newest members of the Court
indicated general agreement with the Chief Justice's dissent in Bivens.40
Justice Blackmun noted that he agreed "with nearly all that Mr. Justice
Powell has to say in his detailed and persuasive concurring opinion,"',
but no other Justices associated themselves with that opinion.
Like Chief Justice Burger in Bivens, the Commission made no
attempt to evaluate the effect on the exclusionary rule by modifying it
to apply only to "substantial" unconstitutional conduct. The proposed
modification would, however, significantly undermine the deterrence
benefits of the exclusionary rule without ameliorating the problem of
supplying a defense to guilty defendants. In Bivens, Chief Justice Burger
perceived that "obviously the public interest would be poorly served if
law enforcement officials were suddenly to gain the impression, however
erroneous, that all constitutional restraints on police had somehow been




"Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 267 (1973).
"Id. at 249.
-'Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971).
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restriction of the exclusionary rule to "substantial violations" will result
in almost as great a disservice as its outright overruling.
The success of the exclusionary rule depends upon its communicat-
ing to law enforcement officers as an inevitable proposition that the
fruits of an illegal search will be useless to them in any prosecution.'
3
Hedging that sanction by advising the officers that "maybe the prosecu-
tor can avoid exclusion even if the search was illegal" can carry only
one message. Law enforcement officers cannot realistically be expected
to concern themselves about the distinctions between legal and illegal
searches if in either case they can generally use in judicial proceedings
whatever the search turns up. Drawing the exclusionary line on the basis
of the substantiality of the violation will reinforce the impression among
law enforcement officers that backing off the exclusionary rule is the
same as backing off the substantive standards themselves. For that
matter, as far as constitutional violations are concerned, can there be
an "unreasonable" search or seizure that is not also a "substantial
violation" of the fourth amendment? The constitution has built its own
flexibility around the definition of tolerable invasions of privacy, mak-
ing it semantically difficult to disassociate an exception to the exclusion-
ary rule based on the nature of the police conduct from a violation of
the substance of the fourth amendment itself. Even if law enforcement
officers learned the difference, would they be any more motivated to
abstain from illegal but potentially productive searches than they are
now motivated to refrain from illegal searches designed for purposes
other than finding judicially useful evidence? As to violations of purely
state law provisions, there are some statutory requirements for warrant
procedure that may be regarded as "technical" and that should not be
enforced by the exclusionary rule. The legislation now in force provides
for that. By changing the term "technical" to the term "substantial"
and introducing a highly subjective definition of that term, the Commis-
sion is inviting police officers to ignore such fundamental requirements
recommended by the Commission as giving notice of a right to refuse
consent before obtaining consent to a search, giving notice of authority
and purpose before forcibly entering a home to search it, and recording
of a search warrant application.
The factors listed by the Commission as being among the circum-
stances to be considered in determining whether a violation is "substan-
tial" illustrate the elasticity of this new concept. One factor is the "ex-
"See Broeder, The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 41 NEB. L. REv. 185, 203 (1961).
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tent to which exclusion will tend to deter future violations of this Chap-
ter."" But exclusion in any single case or on a sporadic basis can be
expected to have no deterrent effect. Only a regular and reliable refusal
by the courts to exploit illegal searches will discourage their commis-
sion.
A second factor in the determination of the substantiality of a
violation is "the extent to which the violation was wilful." If that factor
were simply "whether the violation was wilful" it might be manageable
even though not desirable. Even if a violation were committed with an
awareness of its unlawful character and without the justification of
exigent circumstances, this factor would allow a court to find that,
though wilful, it was not wilful enough to justify exclusion of its fruits.
Such a rule would put a premium on police ignorance of search and
seizure law.
A third factor is "the extent of the deviation from lawful conduct."
Insofar as state law violations are concerned, the standard of "techni-
cal" violations now in force would seem more serviceable than the
proposed standard. If this factor were also applied to constitutional
violations, its meaning would be difficult to fathom in view of the fact
that the central concept of the fourth amendment is reasonableness.
The final factor is "the importance of the particular interest vio-
lated." Except for violations of state law requirements that may fairly
be regarded as "technical," the interest violated in all search and seizure
cases is the same-the fundamental right to privacy. To the extent that
there might be a greater interest in privacy in the home, for example,
than in an automobile, substantive search and seizure standards take
cognizance of them already. 5 In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held
that even a stop-and-frisk on the street "is a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly. '46 The Court
insisted that "it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure per-
formed in public by a policeman while the citizen stands helpless, per-
haps facing a wall with his hands raised, is a 'petty indignity.' "4
"See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968).
"See. e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971): Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968) (per curiam); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925). As the Supreme Court said in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968), "the specific content
and incidents of this right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted."
"'Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 17 (1968).
171d. at 16-17.
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The unpredictability of the application of the exclusion sanction
will withdraw the in terrorem impact of the exclusionary rule (especiaily
since the officers involved in an illegal search will not be personally
penalized when it does strike) and yet will still result in the needless
forfeiture of cases whenever the sanction is in fact applied. Indeed, this
"moderation" of the exclusionary rule may be counterproductive. It
may popularize illegal searches to such an extent that more evidence has
to be thrown out than now is the case; it may also discourage officers
from utilizing lawful procedures in the hope that their saving of time or
effort might be rewarded by a judicial disinclination to hold their viola-
tion "substantial." Application of the exclusionary rule would become
so fraught with conditions as to hold out hope to law enforcement
officers that an illegal search might be worthwhile. This hope would
supply an incentive to engage in such a search sufficient in too many
cases to override the deterrence of the exclusionary rule. The failure of
the Commission to propose an effective civil damage remedy or any
other effective alternative procedure for enforcing search and seizure
law exacerbates this problem: the emphasis on legal procedures in the
exclusionary rule is being softened without any corresponding encour-
agement of lawful investigative techniques being provided police officers
from any other source. Before North Carolina takes a step so inconsist-
ent with more than two decades of state policy, it should have convinc-
ing evidence that it is necessary. No such evidence is available.
(2) The Suppression Hearing
(a) Procedure. Under present North Carolina law, the appropri-
ate time for a defendant to raise the issue of illegal search and seizure
is at trial when the fruits of the search are offered in evidence." The
court may in its discretion hold a hearing on that issue in advance of
trial,' ' and North Carolina courts often do so.5" Such a pre-trial hearing
on the admissibility of the evidence frees the trial of unnecessary inter-
ruptions.5'
The Commission, seeking to standardize the use of the pre-trial
hearing procedure, has recommended that if a defendant desires to
"KSee State v. Thompson, 15 N.C. App. 416, 419, 190 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1972).
" See State v. Pike, 273 N.C. 102, 105-06, 159 S.E.2d 334, 336-37 (1968), State v. Myers, 266
N.C. 581, 583, 146 S.E.2d 674, 676 (1966).
1'See State v. Turnbull, 16 N.C. App. 542, 543, 192 S.E.2d 689, 690 (1972); COMMENTS 236.
1C f. State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 579, 180 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1971).
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suppress evidence on the ground that it was obtained unlawfully, he
must do so prior to trial.52 The motion must be made in writing and
supported by an affidavit.53 To facilitate this procedure, the Commis-
sion would impose an obligation on the prosecution to notify the defen-
dant at least twenty working days before trial of any evidence that it
has obtained by virtue of a search conducted without a search warrant
or out of his presence. If the prosecution fails to give this notice, the
defendant may then raise his objection for the first time at trial." The
court may decide the pre-trial motion summarily if the papers filed by
both sides do not raise a triable issue of fact,56 or may hold a hearing
before or during trial.17 "The judge must set forth in the record his
findings of facts and conclusions of law.""8 If denied, the motion may
be renewed before or during trial only upon a showing "that additional
pertinent facts have been discovered by the defendant which he could
not have [earlier] discovered with reasonable diligence . . . 59
In addition to expediting trials, this procedure will enable motions
to suppress illegal evidence to be disposed of before the swearing-in of
a juror or a witness causes jeopardy to attach.60 This will enable the
'!Proposed .§ 15A-976(a), -979(d). This requirement would also apply to a motion to suppress
evidence obtaned in violation of some provision of the Constitution other than the fourth amend-
ment, such as an illegal confession. It is constitutional as long as the defendant is aware that the
evidence would be offered in time to make a pre-trial motion, and the Commission's proposal
makes such knowledge a condition of the requirement.
Dispatch in the trial of criminal causes is essential in bringing crime to book. Therefore,
timely steps must be taken to secure judicial determination of claims of illegality on the
part of agents of the Government in obtaining testimony. To interrupt the course of the
trial for such auxiliary inquiries impedes the momentum of the main proceeding and
breaks the continuity of the jury's attention. . . . And if such a claim is made after the
trial is under way [sic], the judge must likewise be satisfied that the accused could not
at an earlier stage have had adequate knowledge to make his claim.
Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341-42 (1939); see United States v. Allen, - F.2d -'
- (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cranson, 453 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1971).
Separate provision is made for challenging the admissibility of evidence obtained by wiretap-





57d. .§ 15A-976(c), -977(d).
-Id. § 15A-977(f).
9Id. § 15A-976(d).
"See United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S.
734 (1963): Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); cf. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S.
458 (1973). Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 688, 691 (1949); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
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prosecution to obtain review of an adverse decision by means of an
interlocutory appeal without violating the fifth amendment's proscrip-
tion against double jeopardy. Allowing the prosecutor to appeal that
decision would minimize the occasions when an erroneous trial court
decision on the collateral search and seizure question might foreclose
or weaken a prosecution. It might also create an atmosphere in which
trial judges will be more willing to grant a motion to suppress since they
know that this decision can be reviewed. The prosecutorial appeal per-
mits the state to obtain an authoritative ruling on the questioned proce-
dure without encouraging the police to continue a practice held unlawful
in order to create an appealable test case in which a different judge
makes a ruling in their favor."' Accordingly, the Commission has also
recommended a provision authorizing the prosecutor to appeal from the
granting of a motion to suppress upon certifying "that the appeal is not
taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence is essential to the
case.' '1 2 No corresponding interlocutory appeal from the denial of a
motion to suppress would be afforded to the defendant. But provision
would be made for him to obtain appellate review upon appeal from a
judgment of conviction, specifically "including a judgment entered upon
a plea of guilty.
'6 3
(b) The Scope of the Hearing. The basic issues are whether the
search was constitutionally "unreasonable" and whether, in the Com-
mission's formulation, there were any "substantial violations" of state
law in its conduct. With regard to the constitutional question, the issue
of reasonableness ordinarily breaks down into two parts: whether there
was probable cause or, alternatively, some legal basis for searching
without probable cause, 4 and whether there was a lawful search warrant
"UNITED STATES PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 140 (1967).
'Proposed § 15A-979(c). Commonwealth v. Fisher, 422 Pa. 134, 221 A.2d 115 (1966). Several
jurisdictions already provide for an interlocutory appeal by the prosecution from an adverse ruling
on a suppression motion. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(o) (West Supp. 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
I 1OA, § 604(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 632.11 (Supp. 1973). N.Y.
CRIM. PRO. LAW § 450.20 (McKinney 1971).
Because the term "essential to the case" is not defined, it might give rise to litigation over its
meaning that should be avoided by clarification in the statute.
'Proposed § 15A-979(b).
"The most frequent situation in which probable cause is not required for a search is when the
search is conducted with the consent of a person entitled to give it. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973); Proposed .§ 15A-221 to -223. Probable cause may also be unnecessary for a
border search, see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535 (1973) (dictum), and for a
welfare search, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The question of whether probable cause is
needed for a stop-and-frisk is discussed infra Part D.
[Vol. 52
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
or some recognized exigent circumstance justifying dispensing with it."
Thus the reasonableness under the fourth amendment of most
searches depends in part upon whether they were conducted with proba-
ble cause. If a search is conducted without a warrant, the question of
the existence of probable cause will be judicially reviewed for the first
time at the suppression hearing because the courts and not the searching
officer are the ultimate judges of probable cause. If before conducting
a search, an officer obtained a warrant, the issuing judicial officer pre-
sumably determined the existence of probable cause. To what extent
should the defendant be permitted to challenge the factual basis for that
determination at the suppression hearing? There are as many as five
possible answers: (1) the defendant should not be permitted to inquire
into the facts behind the warrant at all; (2) the defendant should be
permitted to test the truthfulness of the affiant's oath, but not any of
the underlying information, such as an informer's tip relied on by the
affiant in good faith; (3) the defendant should be permitted to contest
the truthfulness of the affiant's oath, and to inquire into the truthfulness
of any underlying information, such as an informant's tip, only for the
purpose of testing the good faith of the affiant's reliance on that infor-
mation; (4) the defendant should be permitted to test the truthfulness
of the affiant's oath and also of all the information upon which it is
based; and (5) before a factual challenge to a warrant will be permitted,
the defendant should be required to make an advance showing of a
reasonable basis for doubting the affidavit.
The question of whether a defendant must be permitted to chal-
lenge the factual basis of a search warrant is an open one in the annals
of the United States Supreme Court.6 North Carolina case law has not
4The recognized exigent circumstances include: search incident to a lawful arrest, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); search of a mobile or impounded vehicle, Cady v. Dombrowski,
93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S.
364 (1964): Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); search based on consent, Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); stop-and-frisk, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968); border search, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535
(1973) (dictum); welfare search, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). The question of whether
a national security search may be conducted without advance judicial approval is unresolved. See
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
"In Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964), the Court said: "Petitioner attacks the
validity of the search warrant. This Court has never passed directly on the extent to which a court
may permit such examination when the search warrant is valid on its face and when the allegations
of the underlying affidavit establish 'probable cause' . . . . Id. at 531-32. Earlier in Steele v.
United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925), the Court held:
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yet come to grips with the problem either. The clearest statement on the
issue came in the recent court of appeals decision in State v. Salem. 7
In that case, the court upheld the refusal of the trial court to require a
police officer to answer questions designed to attack the credibility of
an informer who furnished information relied upon by the officer in
applying for the search warrant. The court said that the "question be-
fore the trial court was not whether the informer was in fact reliable,
but whether the facts sworn to by the officer as being within his personal
knowledge were sufficient to support the magistrate's independent de-
termination that the informer was reliable and that the information
given by the informer to the affiant was probably accurate.""8 If that
were all that the court had said on the subject, its holding would not
foreclose a challenge to the validity of a search warrant by showing that
the officer's affidavit was false, but would simply not permit a showing
that the informer's tip was false. It would also indicate that the facts
attributed to the informer may not be probed even for the purpose of
testing the credibility of the officer. Such a holding would have sufficed
to decide the case, but the court went on to imply that the scope of a
defendant's challenge is limited to the face of the affidavit and the
search warrant."
Similarly enigmatic is the court of appeals' language in State v.
Logan." After holding that the variations between the affidavit and the
testimony of the affiant-officer at the suppression hearing were insignifi-
cant, the court wrote a puzzling paragraph. The first sentence seems to
grant a right to a factual challenge to the affidavit: "[i]f the defendant
wishes to attack the motives and the credibility of the affiant or the
If the grounds on which the warrant was issued be controverted, the judge or commis-
sioner must proceed to take testimony in relation thereto, and the testimony of each
witness must be reduced to writing and subscribed by each witness. If it appears. ..
that there is no probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which the
warrant was issued, the judge or commissioner must cause the property to be restored
to the person from whom it was taken.
1i. at 501. See also Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 505, 511 (1925): "iT~he question of the
competency of the evidence of the whiskey by reason of the legality or otherwise of its seizure was
a question offact and law for the court... "(emphasis added.) However, both Steele cases were
based on a statute that explicitly provided for a factual hearing if the grounds for issuance of a
warrant were controverted. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, Title XI, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217, 228.
717 N.C. App. 269, 193 S.E.2d 755 (1973).
"Id. at 274, 199 S.E.2d at 758.
"The court said: "The affidavit was before the court and a voir dire hearing was not required
in order for the court to find that the facts contained therein were sufficient to meet constitutional
and statutory requirements." Id.
"18 N.C. App. 557, 197 S.E.2d 238 (1973).
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magistrate, defendant should be given the opportunity to offer evidence
for that purpose."'" The next sentence is unclear:
However, if the affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause, the
defendant's objection does not impose the burden upon the State of
going back through the testimony and the motions of the warrant
issuing process for the purpose of allowing defendant an opportunity
to pick out some insignificant and inconsequential inconsistency be-
tween the present testimony and the affidavit which was before the
magistrate.
7 2
That sentence might be understood either as withdrawing that right
unless the defendant shows a substantial basis for a hearing or as merely
repeating its holding that insignificant inconsistancies do not rebut the
existence of probable cause. The next two sentences, on the other hand,
seem to prohibit presenting any facts at the suppression hearing that
were not before the magistrate:
Upon the motion to suppress, the inquiry is not whether probable
cause to issue the search warrant exists at the time of the trial. The
proper inquiry is whether there were sufficient facts before the magis-
trate at the time of issuing the search warrant to justify the magis-
trate's finding of probable cause, and whether the warrant complies
with the statute.
73
Dictum in State v. McCoy74 also would deny a hearing: "The mag-
istrate is entitled to rely upon the sworn statement of the affiant, a police
officer, in concluding that the affiant was correctly reciting his own
observations, and what had been told him by his informer.' "75 Although
711d. at 558. 197 S.E.2d at 240.
721d. at 558-59, 197 S.E.2d at 240.
Wd. at 559. 197 S.E.2d at 240.
;116 N.C. App. 349, 191 S.E.2d 897 (1972).
"Id. at 352, 191 S.E.2d at 899. See also State v. Steele, 18 N.C. App. 126, 196 S.E.2d 379
(1973). In that case, a police officer's affidavit for a search warrant authorizing the search of a
home for narcotics was round to have contained erroneous information that the defendant had
prevously been convicted of a narcotics violation. The court held: "However, this error is immater-
ial because the trial court found that Officer Nesbitt's affidavit was nevertheless sufficient on its
face to support a linding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant." Id. at 129,
196 S.E.2d at 381.
The apparent meaning of that holding is that if the error had been material to the establishing
of probable cause, it would have vitiated the warrant, thus suggesting that a factual inquiry into
the allidavit is proper. If the court did intend to authorize such a hearing, its decision raises another
question: if the affidavit, expurgated of all false statements, still contains sufficient facts to meet
the requirements of probable cause, should it be upheld on that basis? On the one hand, there is
an argument that had the magistrate known that the statements were false, he might have withheld
1973]
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some trial courts in this state have permitted challenges to the factual
basis for the affidavit,7 no appellate decision has yet held in favor of a
right to such a factual hearing.
Thus North Carolina case law might be counted with a number of
other state decisions 77 and some early unclear federal cases78 that pre-
a search warrant or at least demanded a further showing to satisfy himself that there was a
legitimate basis for the search. On the other hand, there is an argument that if the question of
probable cause can be contested in an adversary hearing, the judge presiding at that hearing should
be able to make his own determination on all the facts: the test is "[w]hether there was sufficient
evidence before the issuing magistrate to justify a finding of probable cause." State v. MeKoy, 16
N.C. App. 349, 352, 191 S.E.2d 897. 899 (1972).
The decision is, however, open to a different interpretation. Because the court said the "affida-
vit was nevertheless sullicient on its face to support a finding of probable cause," State v. Steele.
sutpra at 129. 196 S.E.2d at 381, the court may have meant that it was improper to go behind the
face of the warrant at all. The term "nevertheless" suggests that the court was excluding the
erroneous information from its calculation of probable cause. However, a reasonable interpretation
is that the court found the erroneous information immaterial because the uncontested information
was sullicient to establish probable cause.
76State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973); State v. Upchurch, 267 N.C. 417, 148
S.E.2d 259 (1966): State v. Logan, 18 N.C. App. 557, 197 S.E.2d 238 (1973): State v. Steele, 18
N.C. App. 126, 196 S.E.2d 379 (1973): State v. Wrenn, 12 N.C. App. 146, 182 S.E.2d 600 (1971),
cert. denied. 405 U.S. 1064 (1972); ef. State v. Rainey. 236 N.C. 738, 74 S.E.2d 139 (1953). In
Miller and Upchurch, the trial court received and the North Carolina Supreme Court considered
testimony by the issuing magistrate about his failure to scrutinize the affidavit or search warrant.
In Logan and Steele, the evidence showed that a police officer's affidavit contained erroneous
information, but in each case the court held the error was immaterial. In Wrenn, the trial court
did hold a voir dire inquiry into the factual basis for the search set out in the affidavit, and
concluded that "[tihe evidence on voir dire only serves to strengthen the probable cause." 12 N.C.
App. at 147-48, 182 S.E.2d at 601. In Rainev, the court apparently allowed evidence as to the
circumstances of the administering of the oath to the officer applying for the search warrant. Cf.
State v. Peters, 107 N.C. 876. 12 S.E. 74 (1890).
See discussion of State v. Howell, 18 N.C. App. 610, 197 S.E.2d 616 (1973), in note 146 infra.
-United States v. Ketterman, 276 A.2d 243 (D.C. App. 1971); People v. Mitchell, 45 III. 2d
148. 258 N.E.2d 345, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970). People v. Bak, 45 III. 2d 140, 258 N.E.2d
341, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970); State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 497 P.2d 275 (1972); Tucker
v. State. 244 Md. 488, 224 A.2dl II(1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024 (1967); Smith v. State,
191 Md. 329, 62 A.2d 287 (1948). cert. denied, 336 U.S. 925 (1949); Dawson v. State. I I Md.
App. 694, 276 A.2d 680 (1971): State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 293 A.2d 649 (1972); Gaddis v. State,
447 P.2d 42 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968): Southard v. State, 297 P.2d 585 (Okla. Crim. App. 1956):
Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544, 399 S.W.2d 507 (1965) (dictum); Poole v. State, 467 S.W.2d 826
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1971): Jackson v. State, 365 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Crim.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
956 (1963).
,'Kenney v. United States, 157 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (arrest warrant; the opinion does
not indicate whether the defendant sought to challenge the affiant's truthfulness or that of his
inforimners, if any): Gracie v. United States. 15 F.2d 644, 646 (Ist Cir. 1926), cert. denied. 273 U.S.
748 (1927). (In dictum, the court said that the magistrate's determination of probable cause is
conclusive, but left room for reversal if the magistrate's "judgment is arbitrarily exercised." The
holding in the case was that unlawfully obtained information could not be used in an affidavit for
a search warrant. To the extent that the court might have been saying in its dictum that the
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clude any factual challenge to the probable cause that supported a
search conducted pursuant to a warrant. Most of the modern federal
decisions"J and several recent state court opinions,80 however, permit
some inquiry into the facts behind the warrant. These decisions take a
correct view of the nature of the suppression hearing. The seizure of
evidence is subject to the fundamental notice and hearing requirements
of due process because it is a taking of property as well as a critical stage
of a criminal proceeding. The principal remedy that a defendant may
hope for at the suppression hearing is that he regain some control over
the property by excluding it from evidence in the criminal case against
him.' In addition, if he is entitled to possession of the property, it will
magistrate's determination is conclusive even if he finds probable cause on insufficient facts, the
Supreme Court has clearly overruled that proposition. UnitedStates v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971);
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969): Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964): Giordenello
v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958)); United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 225 (W.D. Mo.
1931) (The court said the determination of the magistrate as to the facts was conclusive "unless
arbitrary-): United States v. Gianaris, 25 F.R.D. 194, 194-95 (D.D.C. 1960) (The opinion did not
indicate whether the defendant sought to attack the truth of the affiant's statement or that of his
underlying information); United States v. Doe, 19 F.R.D. 1, 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1956) (The court said
that the "'[validity of the warrant is to be determined as of the date of its issue" without stating
whether the defendant attempted to raise questions of truthfulness). But see United States v.
IHenderson, 17 F.R.D. I, 2 (D.D.C. 1954) (granting a motion to suppress on the ground that
because of mistaken identity the affiant erroneously believed the defendant had a record, without
considering whether the officer's mistaken belief was reasonable and could therefore still have been
considered in determining probable cause).
" United States v. Upshaw, 448 F.2d 1218, 1221-22 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Dunnings, 425 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1969) (dictum), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1002 (1970); United
States ev reL De Rosa v. La Vallee, 406 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1969) (dictum); United States
v. Roth. 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206, 222 (2d Cir.
1966) (dictum): United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459, 463 n.4 (2d Cir. 1966) (dictum); United
States v. Bowling, 351 F.2d 236, 241-42 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); King v.
United States. 282 F.2d 398, 400 n.4 (4th Cir. 1960): United States v. Pearce, 275 F.2d 318, 321-
22 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. Facarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1044 (D. IvMd. 1972), affd sub
nont. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 411 U.S. 905 (1973) (No.
72-1057): LeDent v. Wolff, 334 F. Supp. 64, 71 (D. Neb. 1971) (dictum); United States v. McDon-
nell, 315 F. Supp. 152, 163 (D. Neb. 1970) (dictum); United States v. Ortiz, 311 F. Supp. 880,
884 (D. Colo. 1970) (dictum); United States v. Gardner, 308 F. Supp. 425,427-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(micr.) (dictum); United States v. Halsey, 257 F. Supp. 1002, 1005-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (dictum);
3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 673 at 106-07 (1969). See also United States
v. Racl. 467 F.2d 333, 336 (10th Cir. 1972); Nez v. United States, 365 F.2d 286, 287-88 (10th Cir.
1966).
"Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 97-98, 501 P.2d 234, 248-49, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226,
(1972): .lones v. State, 126 Ga. App. 841,-., 192 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1972); State v. George,.
La ..... 273 So. 2d 34, 36 (1973) (dictum); State v. Baca, 84 N.M. 513. 515, 505 P.2d 856,
858 (1973) (dictum); People v. Alfinito, 16 N.Y.2d 181, 186, 211 N.E.2d 644, 646, 264 N.Y.S.2d
243. 246 (1965).
"'Proposed § 15A-979(a).
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be restored to him at the conclusion of the case. 2 Some illegally ob-
tained evidence may not be returned to the defendant, such as contra-
band, property not belonging to him, and conversation captured by
wiretapping. However, privacy is protected by the fourth amendment as
well as the physical item seized. 3 While the defendant will not have the
privacy that was taken from him redelivered if he prevails at the sup-
pression hearing, an order prohibiting further use of the evidence will
restore to him some privacy. In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,8 t the
United States Supreme Court recognized that, like tangible property,
the intangible interest in individual privacy may not be taken without
the due process of notice and a hearing. Since a warrant issues and a
seizure is undertaken as part of the criminal trial, the due process hear-
ing should be available to the defendant in the same process.8 5 It is the
only hearing provided by law suitable for this purpose, and an indepen-
dent action for damages is not an adequate substitute.8,
Although ordinarily due process requires that the opportunity for
an adversary hearing be provided before the taking of any property,87
in some "emergency circumstances" the hearing may be postponed until
promptly after the taking. 8 The fourth amendment specifically ad-
dresses the prerequisites for a search and seizure of property, and con-
tains no requirement for a prior adversary hearing. Thus, for due pro-
cess purposes as well, a valid search and seizure by law enforcement
officers in pursuit of evidence of a crime should qualify as an "emer-
gency circumstance" excusing a pre-taking adversary hearing."
-Id.
Kat/v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
"1400 U.S. 433 (1971). In Constantineau the Court held unconstitutional a statute providing
for the posting in retail liquor stores of notices forbidding the sale of liquor to certain persons
determined to be problem drinkers. The Court held, "Where a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential." Id. at 437.
•'5Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v,
Fanmily Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
".See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 77-78 (1972). See also note 24 supra, and accompanying
text.
'Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972): Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Sniadach v. Famiy Fin. Corp., 385 U.S. 337 (1969):
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306. 313 (1950).
"Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594,
599-600 (1950): Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 253 (1947). Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S.
589. 595-97 (1931).
ln Fiuentes i Shevin, the Court wrote:
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The dispensation, however, is for a postponement of the hearing
only, not relief from the hearing requirement altogether. In Morrissey
v. Brewer" and Gagnon v. Scarpelli9' the United States Supreme Court
held that the arrest of an alleged parole or probation violator must be
followed "as promptly as convenient""2 with a preliminary hearing into
the probable cause for holding the alleged violator. Since the arrest of
a person, as well as the seizure of his property, is governed by the fourth
amendment, it was reasonable for the Court to dispense with the re-
quirement of an advance adversary hearing. Nevertheless, the Court
held that due process requires a prompt hearing after arrest."'
Since all jurisdictions provide some kind of suppression hearing,
the controversy in the cases focuses on the extent of the inquiry at the
hearing. Due process, however, requires that all issues in dispute be
subject to the hearing requirement. For example, in Bell v. Burson,94 the
Supreme Court reviewed the Georgia procedure under which a motorist
involved in an accident was required to surrender his driver's license
unless he (1) had adequate liability insurance to cover potential damages
arising out of the accident, (2) posted similarly adequate security, or (3)
presented a notarized release from liability and proof of future financial
responsibility. The purpose of the law was to assure financial responsi-
bility for automobile accident damages, but the penalty of loss of license
resulted without regard to whether the motorist was at fault in the
accident. The state provided a pre-forfeiture hearing on the question of
financial responsibility but refused to entertain any questions of fault
The seizure of possessions under a writ of replevin is entirely different from the
ei/urc of possessions under a search warrant. First, a search warrant is generally issued
to serve a highly inportant governmental need-e.g., the apprehension and conviction
of criminals-rather than the mere private advantage of a private party in an economic
transaction. Second, a search warrant is generally issued in situations demanding
prompt action. The danger is all too obvious that a criminal will destroy or hide evidence
or fruits of his crime if given any prior notice. Third, the Fourth Amendment guarantees
that the State will not issue search warrants merely upon the conclusory application of
a private party. It guarantees that the State will not abdicate control over the issuance
of warrants and that no warrant will be issued without a prior showing of probable cause.
Thus, our decision today in no way implies that there must be opportunity for an
adversary hearing before a search warrant is issued.
407 U.S. 67, 93-94 n.30 (1972).
"408 U.S. 471 (1972).
9"411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).
'-408 U.S. at 485: 411 U.S. at 782.
'Wee generalli Nakell, The Effect of Due Process on Criminal Defense Dicovery, 62 Ky.
L. REv. - - (1973).
"1402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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or liability. Although Georgia argued that fault and liability were irrele-
vant to its statutory scheme, the Court disagreed. "Since the statutory
scheme makes liability an important factor in the State's determination
to deprive an individual of his license, the State may not, consistently
with due process, eliminate consideration of that factor in its prior
hearing."" ' The hearing required must be "appropriate to the nature of
the case,"" and therefore the Court held that "a hearing which excludes
consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of
the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this stan-
dard.""7
Similarly, in Stanley v. Illinois,98 the Supreme Court held that the
due process right to a hearing contemplates that all relevant issues be
subject to litigation in the hearing. Relying on Bell v. Burson, Stanley
held violative of this due process principle an Illinois law providing that
the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death
of the mother. Upon a hearing under the statute, the father might
challenge the determination of illegitimacy but is not permitted to rebut
the presumption of unfitness following from that determination. Al-
though the state argued that fitness was irrelevant at the hearing, the
Court concluded otherwise.
The State's interest in caring for Stanley's children is de minirnis if
Stanley is shown to be a fit father. It insists on presuming rather than
proving Stanley's unfitness solely because it is more convenient to
presume than to prove. Under the Due Process Clause that advantage
is insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing when the issue at
stake is the dismemberment of his family.9
9
These cases demonstrate that the scope of a hearing on a motion
to suppress evidence seized under a warrant must include all issues
relevant to the dispute. The issue, then, is simply what are the issues at
such a hearing. Whatever policy arguments might be mustered to sup-
port a broad or a narrow hearing, due process must be accorded. If
probable cause is an issue, the state may not foreclose inquiry into the
factual or legal aspects of that issue by a presumption that the affiant
is telling the truth, even if in most cases he is. The Supreme Court
rejected a similar argument in Stanley:
'Id. at 541.
'Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
7402 U.S. at 542.




Despite Bell . . . it may be argued that unmarried fathers are so
seldom fit that Illinois need not undergo the administrative inconveni-
ence of inquiry in any case, including Stanley's. . . . But the Constitu-
tion recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one
might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile
values of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for effi-
ciency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy government
officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones. °0
The issue of whether there was probable cause for the warrant must
therefore be subject to a hearing comporting with due process standards.
But who has to have the probable cause-the issuing judicial officer, the
affiant (police officer or private citizen), or the informer?"' If the judi-
cial officer is the one who has to have the probable cause, the hearing
should go no further than into the good faith of his belief in the represen-
tations of the affidavit. If it is the affiant, his truthfulness is at issue. If
it is the informer, the hearing must probe the truth of all the statements
made to the magistrate for the purpose of securing a warrant.
The role of the judicial officer is merely to review the averments
presented to him to determine whether he believes them and whether, if
he does, they constitute probable cause. His function is passive; it de-
pends upon his being disinterested in the ferreting out of evidence and
therefore disassociated from the executive or law enforcement branch
in its quest for probable cause.1 2 Accordingly, he does not have proba-
ble cause-he passes on whether others do. Consequently, the probable
cause issue in the suppression hearing must probe more deeply than
merely into the honesty of the judicial officer's belief in the information
presented to him. 03
'lid. at 656.
"'Obviously the ollicer executing the warrant is not a candidate for shouldering the responsi-
bility for probable cause. Often he knows little more about the case than that a warrant has been
issued.
'9-Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971): Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407
U.S. 345 (1972); State v. Matthews, 270 N.C. 35, 153 S.E.2d 791 (1967).
""A recent article argued in favor of a right to challenge factual assertions in search warrant
allidavits out of a conern that otherwise "a pliant and acquiescent official, and especially a friendly
one, could issue warrants upon ridicuous applications, secure in the invulnerability of his determi-
nation .... .- Forkosch, The Constitutional Right to Challenge the Content of Affidavits Issued
Under the Fourth Antendnent, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 297, 308 (1973). Of course, to the extent that
the ridiculousness of the application appears on its face and does not depend upon refutation of
facts. a determination of probable cause would not be invulnerable. United States v. Harris, 403
U.S. 573 (1971): Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
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Ordinarily, it would seem that probable cause must be possessed
by the government officers involved in the search or prosecution and not
a private citizen. This assumption is challenged when a private citi-
zen-perhaps even a police informer-makes the only affidavit pre-
sented to the judicial officer and does so on the basis of his own observa-
tions. If the magistrate is not the officer responsible for probable cause,
that honor must devolve upon the citizen-affiant for default of any other
candidate. Clearly in that situation the issue is the honesty of the af-
fiant's report.
Typically, however, the issue arises with an affidavit based upon
hearsay, and most commonly when the affiant is a police officer swear-
ing to an informer's tip. The standard for issuance of a warrant is not
certainty of guilt but probable cause.' 4 That standard accommodates
hearsay"'" and tolerates errors. By definition, official reliance in good
faith on misinformation may constitute probable cause. As a result,
probable cause cannot be defeated by proof that the information sup-
plied to the officer-affiant and believed by him is false. Thus the truth
of the informer's tip is simply not an issue. The only issue besides the
sufficiency of the information on its face is the good faith of the officer
with regard to the tip, or with regard to any personal observations
included by the officer in the affidavit.' 0 In order to test the officer's
(1964): Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). The author found "the probability of a
logical and historical right of inquiry into the truthfulness and sufficiency of the papers upon which
a warrant is issued, so as then possibly to denounce whatever occurs therafter." Forkosch, supra
at 329.
'"'In determining what is probable cause, we are not called upon to determine
whether the offense charged has been committed. We are concerned only with the
question whether the affiant had reasonable grounds at the time of his affidavit and the
issuance of the warrant for the belief that the law was being violated on the premises to
be searched.
l)umbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925) (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Sultan, 463 F.2d 1066, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972): Grano, A Dilemma for Defense Counsel: Spinelli-
Harris Search Warrants and the Possibiliy of Police Perjury, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 405, 414-15.
Kipperman. Inaccurate Search Warrant Affidavits As a Ground For Suppressing Evidence, 84
HARV. L. REv. 825, 827-28 (1971); Mascolo, Impeaching the Credibility of Affidavits in Search
Warrants: Piercing the Presumption of Validity, 44 CONN. B.J. 9, 12-13 (1970).
'"'United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102.
108 (1965). Rugcndorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257. 269, 271 (1960): State v. Spillars, 280 N.C. 341, 349-50, 185 S.E.2d 881, 889-90 (1972):
State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 601, 148 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967);
State v. Flowers, 12 N.C. App. 487, 492, 183 S.E.2d 820, 824 (1971).
'"'See Theodor v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 77, 97, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226, - , 501 P.2d 234,
248-49 (1972):
[Wie conclude that only when the affiant has acted unreasonably in making factual
[Vol. 52
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good faith, the defendant at a suppression hearing should be allowed to
inquire into the identity of the informer'07 and the nature and circum-
stances of the tip just as he might probe any first hand observations
reported in the affidavit. The purpose of such examination is not to
attempt to expose the falsity of the tip because that is not in issue. The
purpose is simply to attempt to expose that the officer did not in fact
receive the described tip or that if he did receive it he did not reasonably
believe it."s That is the scope of the probable cause issue, and under due
process it must therefore also be the scope of the hearing into probable
cause.
The argument is advanced, however, that a hearing on that issue
was provided in advance of the search or seizure by the magistrate who
issued the warrant and that promotion of the solemn judicial authority
mistakes must those errors be excised from the affidavit before testing the existence of
probable cause. While undeniably misstatements impede the function of the magistrate,
once it has been determined that the affiant has acted reasonably under the circumstan-
ces, little more can be required of him.
""The Commission would not require disclosure of the identity of an informer whose tip was
used in applying for a search warrant (unless required by the Constitution):
In any proceeding on a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to this section in
which the truthfulness of the testimony presented to establish probable cause is contested
and the testimony includes a report of information furnished by an informant whose
identity is not disclosed in the testimony, the defendant is entitled to be informed of the
informant's identity unless:
(I) The evidence sought to be suppressed was seized by authority of a search
warrant or incident to an arrest with warrant; or
(2) There is substantial corroboration of the informant's existence and reliability
independent of the testimony in question.
The provisions of subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2) do not apply to situations in which
disclosure of an informant's identity is required by controlling decisions.
Proposed § 15A-978(b).
"n'The possibility of false assertions in search warrant affidavits signed by police officers is a
suffliciently serious one that it cannot be ignored in formulating constitutionally adequate proce-
dures for enforcing the fourth amendment. "'The use of the exclusionary rule . . . creates the
occasion and incentive for large scale lying by law enforcement officers.'" Schneckloth v. Busta-
monte, 412 U.S. 218, 268 n.26 (1973) (Powell, J., with Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J. concurring),
quoting Oaks, Stud'ing the Exchsionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 665,
756-77 (1970); United States v. Freeman, 358 F.2d 459, 463 n.4 (2d Cir. 1966); Grano, supra note
104, at 408, 409, 411, 423: Kipperman, supra note 104, at 831; Note, The Outwardly Sufficient
Search Warran: What If It's False?, U.C.L.A.L. REV. 96, 111 (1971); Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv.
1529. 1531 (1967): (f. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967) ("Nothing in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a state court judge in every such hearing to assume
the arresting ollicers are committing perjury."); State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 173, 175-76, 293 A.2d
649, 653-55 (1972). It has been suggested that due process, as well as the fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule, might protect against police perjury before a magistrate. Grano, supra note 104,
at 423: .%ee Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v.Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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of the magistrate requires that binding effect be given to his determina-
tion. I  Aside from the reply that the decisions of all judges in courts of
first instance are subject to appellate review, and that that review has a
similar effect on the authority and morale of the judge, the ready answer
is that the ex parte character of the hearing before the magistrate does
not satisfy due process. There is no notice to the person whose property
is taken, and no opportunity for that person to be heard-either by
presenting his own witnesses or by confronting those against him."
Althrough the formalities required of a hearing may vary with the cir-
cumstances, Il' these constitutionally established minima are not even
approached in the ex parte hearing before a magistrate."'
Moreover, it is already clear that one critical aspect of the magis-
trate's determination is subject to review: his decision that on its face
the affidavit established probable cause." 3 Even though a judicial mind
has already passed on the quality of the evidence adduced in this respect,
it is subject to review on the same record as was before the magistrate.
Reversal of his judgment on this basis will likely have a greater impact
on his morale than review on the basis of a claim that he was deceived
or misled, and yet such review has been held necessary to effectuate the
exclusionary rule in warrant cases. In fact, magistrates often do not
scrutinize warrant applications."4 In North Carolina, evidence has accu-
"W'ee State v. Petillo, 61 N.J. 165, 176, 293 A.2d 649, 655 (1972). Kipperman, supra note
104, at 830.
"'In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, the Supreme Court last term listed the rudiments of a due process
hearing in the context of probation or parole revocation: "At the preliminary hearing, a proba-
tioner or parolee is entitled to . . .an opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own
behalf, a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an independent decisionmaker, and a
written report of the hearing." 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471. 486-87 (1972): Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970).
"'Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972): Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971), Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-67
(1970).
"'2"Able and conscientious as . . .magistrates may be. . .they cannot overcome the disad-
vantage, in terms of truth seeking, that they are obligated to decide on an ex parte showing."
MODEL CODE, Commentary 226.
'United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
W. LA FAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965): L.
TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 119-20 (1967): La Fave &
Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement
Decisions. 63 MICH. L. REv. 987, 993 nn.37-38 (1965); Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance
of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices. 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 4-7; Schwartz, The




mulated in the appellate courts that magistrates may issue warrants in
a pro forma manner, "serving merely as a rubber stamp for the po-
lice.""'5
The validity of a search warrant depends upon the facts presented
to the issuing magistrate. If those facts are insufficient on their face to
establish probable cause, the warrant may not be augmented by a show-
ing at the suppression hearing of other facts-whether known to the
officers at the time when they sought the warrant or discovered in the
course of the search or later." 6 It would be inconsistent with the warrant
policy, which operates by requiring advance judicial approval of official
invasions of privacy, to permit justification of the warrant on the basis
of post-warrant disclosures or discoveries. The prosecution's inability to
rely on facts other than those called to the attention of the magistrate
should not similarly restrict the defendant who is in a different position:
he had no chance to present any facts to the magistrate. Some courts
have expressed the proposition that permitting the use of new evidence
to discredit the assertions of the affidavit is an exception to the rule that
review of a warrant is limited to the facts known to the magistrate.117
Perhaps it would be more explanatory to say that the rule is that the
prosecution is bound by the facts it presented to the magistrate while
the defense, which was not invited to participate in that hearing, is for
that reason not restricted by what the prosecution in its discretion chose
to reveal to the magistrate."1
8
On the other hand, a policy argument is made that the inquiry is
not broad enough unless it encompasses a hearing on the truthfulness
of any underlying information including the information contained in
informers' tips. This argument has its quarrel with the rule permitting
hearsay accompanied by indicia of reliability to quality as probable
cause, a rule responsibly ensconced in the law of search and seizure," 9
not with the scope of review of the factual basis for a warrant. There
"'State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 639, 194 S.E.2d 353, 358 (1973); State v. Upchurch, 267 N.C.
417. 418-19, 148 S.E.2d 259, 260-61 (1966).
"'Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964) ("It is elementary that in passing on the
validity or a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magis-
trate's attention."). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 n.12 (1963); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
"'United States ex rel. DeRosa v. LaValle, 406 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1969); United States
v. McDonnell, 315 F. Supp. 152, 163 (D. Neb. 1970). Contra, United States v. Gianaris, 25 F.R.D.
194. 195 (D.D.C. 1960); United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 225 (W.D. Mo. 1931).
"'United States v. Roth, 391 F.2d 507, 509 (7th Cir. 1967).
"'See cases cited note 105 supra.
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would be no sense in receiving hearsay information as sufficient for the
issuance of a warrant, subject, however, to later proof that though
reasonably deemed reliable the hearsay was false. Such a procedure
would undermine the concept of probable cause and in the process
jeopardize reasonable police investigative activity by testing it unneces-
sarily on the basis of after-acquired information rather than the best
information available to the police at the time of acting.
Consistent with this reasoning, the Commission has recommended
the following legislation:
A defendant may contest the validity of a search warrant and the
admissibility of evidence obtained thereunder by contesting the truth-
fulness of the testimony showing probable cause for its issuance. The
defendant may contest the truthfulness of the testimony by cross-
examination or by offering evidence. For the purposes of this section,
truthful testimony is testimony which reports in good faith the circum-
stances relied on to establish probable cause. '
This language clearly includes a right to inquire behind the warrant
into the truthfulness of the affidavit. When a police officer makes the
affidavit based on information supplied to him by an informer, accord-
ing to the Commission's proposal, only the truthfulness of the officer-
affiant's statements could be challenged; the truthfulness of the in-
former's report to the officer would not be in issue, but the honesty of
the officer's belief in the report would be.'2' The Commission's proposal
is broad enough to permit inquiry into the truthfulness of the informer's
tip in order to probe the good faith of the officer's reliance on it. The
language providing that the defendant may contest the truthfulness of
the officer's testimony "by cross-examination or by offering evidence"
contains no qualification as to who may be cross-examined or what
evidence may be offered. Since no limitation is expressed, the provision
should be interpreted to permit a defendant an opportunity to prove the
falsity of the tip as a predicate of his challenge to the truthfulness of
the officer's affidavit.
A number of courts have approved the procedure first suggested in
United States v. Halsey122 that "[u]ntil or unless the defendant has at
least made some initial showing of some potential infirmities he pro-
poses to demonstrate, the magistrate's acceptance of the affidavit as
""Proposed § 15A-978(a).
121See COMMENTS 240.
21257 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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truthful should be enough."' Any such prerequisite to a hearing need
not be prohibitively burdensome. "The right to be heard does not de-
pend upon an advance showing that one will surely prevail at the hear-
ing."'124 Thus, Halsey proposed that the required initial showing be mini-
mal-"some suggestion of a basis or area of doubt."''- Halsey was
concerned only that "such a de novo trial of the issuing magistrate's
determination . . . [not become] a routine step in every case", 26 and
thus interfere with the necessity "that criminal charges be reached on
their merits and resolved with a decent measure of expedition.'
27
However, the delays resulting from factual hearings into the proba-
ble cause for a search warrant should be negligible. 2 8 The Commission
has provided efficient procedures for conducting such hearings. Moreo-
ver, a defendant in a case involving evidence obtained in a warrantless
search has a right to a full factual hearing into probable cause.
29
Nevertheless, the Commission has attempted to strike a balance
with the Halsey suggestion by requiring that a motion to suppress "must
be accompanied by an affidavit containing facts supporting the motion.
The affidavit may be based upon personal knowledge, or upon informa-
tion and belief, if the source of the information and the basis for the
belief are stated."'' 3 As a method of asking a defendant to assert his
good faith in making the motion, this requirement does not seem unrea-
'id. at 1005.
1''Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972). See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 342 (1939):
[M lisehier would result were tenuous claims sufficient to justify the trial court's inquiry
into the legitimacy of evidence in the Government's possession. . . . Therefore claims
that taint attaches to any portion of the Government's case must satisfy the trial court
with their solidity and not be merely a means of eliciting what is in the Government's
possession before its submission to the jury. United States v. Cranson, 453 F.2d 123,
126-27 (4th Cir. 1971).
'2257 F. Supp. at 1006.
12lt. at 1005.
17d.
12'See Grano, supra note 104, at 415-17. Because current North Carolina law requires that
the allidavit supporting a search warrant need not contain all of the information presented to the
magistrate by the alliants, our courts are now required to hold evidentiary hearings to receive
testimony about what the magistrate was told before he issued the warrant, for the purpose of
upholding the warrant. State v. Spillars, 280 N.C. 341, 349, 185 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1972); State v.
Howell. 18 N.C. App. 610, 611, 197 S.E.2d 616, 618 (1973): State v. Logan, 18 N.C. App. 557,
558. 197 S.E.2d 238, 239 (1973).
""See. e.g., McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Proposed § 15A-978(c).
'Proposed § 15A-977(a). Compare MODEL CODE § SS 290.3(I)(b), requiring an affidavit
..setting forth substantial basis for questioning the good faith of the testimony, and such party shall
have the burden of proving the lack of good faith."
19731
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sonable. It looms as an insuperable obstacle in many cases, however, in
view of the proposal to permit the judge summarily to deny the motion
on the basis of the affidavit. 31 Often, the defendant will not be in a
position to know the facts himself. Without an opportunity to cross-
examine the affiant at a deposition or other.pre-trial discovery proce-
dure, denial of a hearing may deny him access to the evidence with
which to mount his challenge. Thus the use of the pre-trial motion
procedure that is employed in civil litigation can succeed only if the civil
deposition opportunities are also included. Since they are not, 32 sum-
marily resolving an issue of constitutional significance against a defen-
dant without enabling him to gather whatever useful evidence might
exist is to render illusory in many cases any right to a hearing on this
issue.
B. SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATIONS-RADIO WARRANTS
The Commission has proposed a procedure that makes it easier for
police officers to obtain search warrants by telephone or radio. The
proposal reads as follows:
In lieu of the written affidavit . the issuing official may take
an oral statement under oath. The oral statement may be transmitted
to the issuing official by radio, telephone, or other electronic communi-
cations device. The oral statement must be recorded and transcribed
and the transcribed statement is an affidavit for the purposes of this
Article. The recording of the sworn oral statement and the transcribed
statement must be certified by the official receiving it and must be filed
with the clerk of the court.
The issuing official may orally authorize a law enforcement offi-
cer by radio, telephone, or other electronic communications device to
sign the issuing official's name and title on a duplicate original war-
rant. The authorization must be recorded and transcribed, certified by
the issuing official making it, and filed along with the recorded and
transcribed application with the clerk. A duplicate original warrant is
a search warrant for the purposes of this Chapter, and it must be
returned to the clerk . . . . The clerk must file both the original war-
rant and the duplicated original warrant.'
'Proposed § 15A-977(b).
'See id. §§ 15A-611 to -614, -901 to -910.
'-Id. § 15A-244(b), -245(c).
[Vol. 52
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The proposal was evidently based on similar California legislation
adopted in 1970,'31 although the California statute refers only to "an
oral statement" and does not specify that it may come over a radio or
the telephone. The North Carolina Police Executives Association sub-
mitted a similar proposal to the 1973 legislature.
135
The purpose of the proposal is to expedite the warrant process when
time is critical in effecting a search. According to the North Carolina
Police Executives Association, that is particularly true
where narcotics are concerned . . . .There simply isn't time to go
through a formalized process of securing a search warrant when, liter-
ally, seconds and minutes mean the difference between effective law
enforcement and frustration. The time it takes to leave the scene of
illegal drug transactions or the source of narcotics information, go
before a warrant-issuing officer, secure a search warrant and return to
the scene to execute the warrant more often than not defeats the pur-
pose of the warrant. Drugs and other contraband move about so fast
that delay almost insures the success of those who move them.,"
The suggested procedure for overcoming these delays enhances the
requirement of prior judicial determination of probable cause and is
consistent with the requirements of the fourth amendment. Under cur-
rent law, a search warrant may be issued on the basis of hearsay if the
magistrate is informed of the underlying circumstances establishing
both the credibility of the hearsay declarant and a substantial basis for
crediting the source.'37 "The police officer making the affidavit may do
.. CAL. PENAL CODE k§ 1526(b), 1528(b) (West Supp. 1973).
'LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM OF THE NORTH CAROLINA POLICE EXECUTIVE'S ASSOCIATION 17
(1972). The text of the proposal, prepared by the North Carolina Association of Law Enforcement
Legal Advisors, reads as follows:
An official authorized . . . to issue warrants may issue a search warrant based upon
statements amounting to probable cause for a search warrant made to him under oath
by a law enforcement officer which are transmitted to him directly by telephone or radio
communicaton. Such telephone or radio communication shall be recorded or tran-
scribed, and the recording or transcription shall be preserved and certified by the official
receiving it. The official authorized to issue the search warrant shall authorize the law
enforcement officer providing the information supporting probable cause for the search
warrant to till in the required warrant information and sign the name of such official to
the search warrant, which warrant shall be valid for all purposes for which it was issued.
'Id. at 6.
"'United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
108 (1965); Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 533 (1964); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960): State v. Spillars, 280 N.C. 341, 349-50, 185 S.E.2d 881, 886-87 (1972);
State v. Bullard, 267 N.C. 599, 601, 148 S.E.2d 565, 567 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 917 (1967);
State v. Flowers, 12 N.C. App. 487, 492, 183 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1971).
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so in reliance upon information reported to him by other officers in the
performance of their duties."' Thus, a police officer in the field could
radio or telephone information constituting probable cause for a search
to a desk officer. He could then prepare an affidavit reciting that infor-
mation and identifying the field officer as his source, even though he has
no personal knowledge of the facts. A valid warrant could then issue and
be delivered to the field officer for execution. Since there is no require-
ment that the officer making the affidavit conduct the search,' this
procedure could save time because the field officer would not have to
leave the scene of the proposed search. In State v. Banks'4 the North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld such a procedure under a statute au-
thorizing searches for illegal liquor.' In that case, a police officer
observed the defendants in their motor vehicle after seeing them carry
large packages to it from a county liquor store. When the defendants
refused to tell the officer what was in the packages and also refused to
consent to a search, the officer radioed police headquarters. He told
another officer what he had observed and asked him to get a search
warrant for the car. The second officer did so on the basis of his own
affidavit, and officers took the search warrant to the first officer.
The present procedure still has cumbersome aspects. The Commis-
sion's proposal would therefore modify existing law by (1) permitting
the field officer to report to the magistrate in a recorded oral affidavit,
and (2) permitting a magistrate who issues a warrant also to authorize
the officer to sign as his agent a duplicate warrant.
The fourth amendment requires warrants to be "supported by oath
or affirmation."' It does not require an affidavit or other writing.'
'State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561 576, 180 S.E.2d 755, 765 (1971). accord, United States v.
Ventresca. 380 U.S. 102. 111 (1965) ("Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged
in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their
number."): Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 529-31 (1964) (upholding a warrant issued
on the basis of an affidavit by one FBI Agent reciting information from reliable informers that
other FBI Agents had supplied to him); United States v. Morin, 250 F. Supp. 507, 509 (D. Conn.
1966). See also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297-98 (1967) (police officers could rely on
information supplied by dispatcher and two drivers of a taxicab company who complained that
the company has just been the victim of an armed robbery). Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214.
225 (1965) (upholding a warrant based on the affidavit of an IRS agent reporting his examination
of income tax returns, business records, and interviews).
"'State v. Tessnear, 265 N.C. 319, 322, 144 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1965); State v. Shermer, 216 N.C.
719, 721. 6 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1940); Proposed § 15A-247.
"250 N.C. 728, 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959) (per curiam).
"'Ch. 1235, § 3 [1957] N.C. Sess. Laws 1174-75 (repealed 1971); see State v. MeLamb, 235
N.C. 251. 69 S.E.2d 527 (1952).
"2U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"'State v. Milton, 7 N.C. App. 425, 427-28, 430, 173 S.E.2d 60, 61-62, 63 (1970).
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"The procedure for the establishment of probable cause is not provided
by the Constitution, and the United State Supreme Court has not man-
dated that any particular procedure is constitutionally required."' 44 In-
deed, present North Carolina law requires only that an affidavit "indi-
cating"-and not necessarily establishing-"the basis for the finding of
probable cause must be a part of or attached to the warrant." '45 Thus,
the affidavit need not contain all of the information relied on by the
magistrate, and there is no current requirement for preserving, by re-
cording, transcription or otherwise, any additional information pre-
sented to him. 4'
The Commission's proposal would improve this situation by requir-
ing that for all search warrants the issuing official may consider infor-
mation only if it is contained in an affidavit or "recorded or contempo-
raneously summarized in the record or on the face of the warrant by
the issuing official."14 7 This accomplishes what the North Carolina
Court of Appeals has recognized as the "better practice"'4 of making
a record of the facts necessary to support probable cause for a warrant.
This provision protects the integrity of judicial review of the validity of
warrants at a suppression hearing.
To obviate the delay in delivery of the warrant to the field officer
"Vd. at 428, 173 S.E.2d at 62.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-26(b) (Supp. 1971).
"'State v. Spillars, 280 N.C. 341, 349, 185 S.E.2d 881, 887 (1972). In State v. Howell, 18
NC. App. 610, 197 S.E.2d 616 (1973), the affiant, who was a law enorcement officer, and the
issuing magistrate gave testimony at the suppression hearing that the officer had told the magis-
trate under oath certain information beyond what was contained in the affidavit. The court found
the additional information essential to the validity of the warrant because the affidavit did not
"contain a statement of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the
undisclosed information is reliable ...." The court upheld the warrant on the basis of that
information even though part of it contradicted the affidavit in a material respect.
The affidavit said: "On Thursday morning, August 3, 1972, affiant received information from
a confidential source that that affiant has been found [sic] to be accurate and reliable in the past."
At the suppresion hearing, however, the officer testified "that while the informant had not given
in the past any information leading to the arrest of any persons, he had given the agent names of
people in the drug business, with which names the agent was familiar." That testimony is inconsist-
ent with the statement in the affidavit that the informer had been found to be reliable in the past;
in fact, his reliability was untested. Concerned in its opinion only with showing that it could
consider that testimony even though not presented in written form to the magistrate, the court did
not even consider that the testimony was not helpful but instead demonstrated a deficiency of
probable cause.
"'Proposed §§ 15A-244(a), -245(a), -297(b).
"'State v. Flowers, 12 N.C. App. 487, 493, 183 S.E.2d 820, 824 (1971); State v. Milton, 7
N.C. App. 425, 431-32, 173 S.E.2d 60, 63-64 (1970) (Graham, J., concurring). See also Sherrick
v. Eyman, 389 F.2d 648, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1968) (Ely, J., dissenting).
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for execution, the Commission's proposal authorizes the issuing official
to instruct the officer to sign his name on a duplicate warrant. In the
ensuing search, the officer will be able to serve the duplicate warrant
but not the original warrant signed personally by the issuing official or
the recorded statement of probable cause. These deficiencies should not
impair the validity of the search. The fourth amendment does not re-
quire that a copy of the warrant invariably be served at the time of the
search."4 9 Yet the proposal does require that:
Before undertaking any search or seizure pursuant to the warrant,
the officer must read the warrant and give a copy of the warrant and
warrant application to the person to be searched, or the person in
apparent control of the premises or vehicle to be searched. If no one
in apparent or responsible control is occupying the premises or vehicle,
the officer must leave a copy of the warrant and warrant application
affixed to the premises or vehicle.'
Compliance with the requirement as far as the warrant itself is
concerned may be accomplished by service of the duplicate warrant,
which "is a search warrant for the purposes of this Chapter."'' The
proposal for radio and telephone warrants does not, however, provide
any method for serving a warrant application with the warrant. Perhaps
a copy of the transcription of the sworn oral statement upon which the
radio or telephone warrant was based should be served as soon as possi-
ble after the search. Also a notice to that effect should be placed in the
duplicate warrant. This procedure would probably satisfy the need for
communicating this information to the subject of the search. In any
event, under the proposals by the Commission concerning the exclusion-
ary rule, the rule will be invoked only if a violation of this provision were
"substantial".
Any relaxation of the requirement that the radio application be
served with the warrant would give rise to a potential danger in the new
procedure. Protection against officers applying for a search warrant
only after conducting the search is rendered more difficult. As the Com-
mission observed, "one of the central functions of the warrant process
"'Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16 (1967); United States v. Leftwich. 461 F.2d
586, 592 (3d Cir. 1972) (arrest warrant); United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir.
1971): Sherrick v. Eyman, 389 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp.
1004, 1014 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); United States v. Gross, 137 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)1 State
v. McDougald, 18 N.C. App. 407, 408-09, 197 S.E.2d II, 12 (1973).




[is] the maintaining of a factual record of the basis for the search
recorded before the search occurs."'' 5 Perhaps a requirement that the
issuing official note the time of issuance of the warrant on the origi-
nal' '3 and the officer do the same on the duplicate warrant before
serving it might have a discouraging effect on submitting after-the-
search applications for warrants. Nevertheless, if the affidavit or its
equivalent cannot be presented before the search, there is no real assur-
ance that the warrant was not applied for after the search has yielded
incriminating evidence and also specific information subsequently
included in the warrant application. 54
Another potential risk in the radio or telephone warrant is that the
issuing official may act in haste because of the insistence .upon speed in
a radio or telephone application. The tendency of the magistrates to
rubber stamp warrant applications without subjecting them to indepen-
dent judicial scrutiny 55 might be more difficult to resist when time
pressures are urged by the field officer. On the other hand, a conscien-
tious magistrate might be better equipped to examine the facts when
communicating directly with the field officer rather than when receiving
the hearsay affidavit of his desk officer. An informer might also be able
to testify directly to the magistrate under circumstances affording an
assurance of anonymity.
Resort to the warrant procedure 5' would be increased by the adop-
tion of the proposal. The use of warrants might be more appealing to
law enforcement officers if warrants did not necessarily involve frustra-
ting delays. Indeed, rapid availability of a warrant could mean that
some search situations now considered sufficiently exigent to justify
dispensing with a warrant-such as some searches of mobile vehicles
57
-might no longer carry their emergency character."" As a result, the
reason for excusing the failure to obtain a search warrant in those
situations would no longer exist.
"'COMMENTS 196.
'1'See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-26(c) (Supp. 1971).
'See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 152 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'"See notes 114, 115 supra.
"cCoolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453-73 (1971).
"'See Cady v. Dombrowski, 93 S. Ct. 2523 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 458-64 (1971): Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
"'See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 20 (1968); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1030-31
(3d Cir. 1972): State v. Banks, 250 N.C. 728, 110 S.E.2d 322 (1959).
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C. CONSENT SEARCHES
"[O]ne of the specifically established exceptions to the require-
ments of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent."' 59 If two persons are in joint possession of or
jointly using property either may consent to a search of that property,""
but not even a husband or wife may consent to a search of the other's
separate property,'6 ' nor may the owner of property consent to its search
if possession and control of it have been yielded to another such as by
a lease.6 2 A common example of permissible third-party consent is the
search of an automobile with the consent of the driver that yields evi-
dence used against a non-consenting passenger.'63
In order to authorize a search, the consent must be given voluntar-
ily. 4 It may "not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by implied
threat or covert force."' 65 For example, consent obtained upon represen-
tation by the searching officers that they had a warrant constitutes only
"acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority," not valid consent.' The
'1Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973); Proposed § 15A-221(a).
"'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 246 & n.34 (1973); Frazier v, Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 740 (1969) ("Petitioner, in allowing Rawls to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must
he taken to have assumed the risk that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside."); State v.
Ray, 274 N.C. 556, 570-72, 164 S.E.2d 457, 467 (1968) ("The apparent owner of the property who
has equal rights to the use of the premises and has equal access to the premises may legally
authorize a search of those premises."): State v. Fowler, 172 N.C. 905. 911-12. 90 S.E. 408, 410
(1916): Proposed § 15A-222(a)(3) ("by a person who by ownership or otherwise is apparently
entitled to give or withhold consent to a search of premises."); cf. Bumper v, North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968): Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
"'State v. Hall, 264 N.C. 559, 562-63, 142 S.E.2d 177, 179-80 (1965). On the other hand, if a
husband or wife retrieves property belonging to the other and delivers it to law enforcement
olicers, no search is involved as long as the husband or wife did not act as an agent for the police.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 486-89 (1971); State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391, 396-
401, 178 S.E.2d 65, 68-71 (1970), cert.denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971); State v. Mizelle, 15 N.C. App.
583, 584, 190 S.E.2d 277, 278 (1972). See also State v. Ray, 274 N.C. 556, 569-73, 164 S.E.2d
457, 465-66, 468 (1968).
"-Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 487-89 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S, 610,
616-18 (1961): State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 242-43, 98 S.E.2d 329, 333-35 (1957).
"'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); State v. Grant, 279 N.C. 337, 340, 182
S.E.2d 400, 402 (1971); State v. Raynes, 272 N.C. 488, 490-91, 158 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1968); State
v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 297-98, 158 S.E.2d 511, 521 (1968); State v. Craddock, 272 N.C. 160,
168-69, 158 S.E.2d 25, 31-32 (1967): State v. Belk, 268 N.C. 320, 322-24, 150 SE.2d 481, 483-84
(1966): State v. Dawson, 262 N.C. 607, 608, 138 S.E.2d 234, 235 (1964).
"'Sehneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973); State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 578-
79, 180 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1971). State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 239, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967);
Proposed § 15A-221(b).
"'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973); State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 578-
79, 180 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1971); State v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 239, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967).
"Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968).
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voluntariness standard for consent searches is of critical importance for
the preservation of the privacy values embodied in the fourth amend-
ment. On the one hand, "it is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments to discourage citizens from aiding to the
utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals."' 67 Yet toler-
ance of the coercive elements that produce unwilling consents may dissi-
pate the protections of the fourth amendment. That tolerance would
provide as a ready alternative to the cumbersome process of applying
to a magistrate for a warrant, the handy process of applying to a citizen
some pressure to induce him to consent to an invasion of his privacy.
"For no matter how subtly the coercion were applied, the resulting
'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police
intrusion against which the FourthAmendment is directed."' 68
Last term, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,169 the United States Su-
preme Court expounded on the voluntariness standard for consent
searches. Borrowing from the coerced confession cases, 170 the Court held
that "the question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary'
or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstan-
ces."'' The Court held that the voluntariness standard did not require
as a constitutional matter that the state prove that the person giving the
consent was aware that he had a right to refuse to do S0.172 But it did
specify that one factor to consider in the overall assessment of voluntari-
ness is whether the searching officers advised the person whose consent
was sought of his constitutional right to withhold it.73
The North Carolina Supreme Court has also ruled that a police
officer need not advise a person of his constitutional rights before ob-
taining his consent to a search. 7 The Commission has recommended,
however, that the statute require that a law enforcement officer first
"inform the individual whose consent is sought that he is under no
obligation to give such consent and that anything found may be taken
"'TCoolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,488(1971). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 243 (1973).
"'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
Ir9Id.
x; Md. at 223-27.
1id. at 227.
'%I. at 231, 245.
1713d. at 227, 229-30, 249.
',"State v. Vestal. 278 N.C. 561, 576, 180 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1971); State v. Virgil, 276 N.C.
217. 228, 172 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1970).
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or used in evidence."'' 5 That recommendation was submitted before
Schneckloth was decided but with an awareness of the decisions of the
North Carolina Supreme Court on the question.
The evaluation of the voluntariness of a consent, made in the delib-
erative calm of a later judicial proceeding, will consider a variety of
factors 7 including the characteristics of the person whose consent is
sought-such as his age, his intelligence, his familiarity with police
investigation, his use of alcohol or drugs-and the circumstances sur-
rounding the consent-including whether the citizen was in custody,
how long he was questioned, what he was told about the authority of
the officers, and what demonstrations of force the officers made. The
police officer must weigh these factors on the spur of the moment.
Moreover, the factors that cause a court ultimately to find that police
advice was necessary to counteract "subtly coercive police questions, as
well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who con-
sents,"'7 7 might not have been apparent to the officer at the time.
One objectively defined category of circumstances in which advice
of the right to refuse may always be constitutionally required is when
the person whose consent is sought is in custody. Schneckloth declared
that an open question' 78 but added: "We do note, however, that other
courts have been particularly sensitive to the heightened possibilities for
coercion when the 'consent' to a search was given by a person in cus-
tody."' 79 Accordingly, the Commission recommended that before ob-
171Proposed § 15A-222(b). The Commission has also recommended a provision that "[a]
search conducted pursuant to the provisions of this Article may not exceed, in duration or physical
scope, the limits of the consent given." Proposed § 15A-223(a). Also, the consent "may be with-
drawn or limited at any time prior to the completion of the search and, if so withdrawn or limited,
the search authorized by the consent must cease, or be restricted to the new limits, as the case
may be." Proposed § 15A-223(c).
This provision seems to be consistent with existing North Carolina law. See State v. Belk,
268 N.C. 320, 323, 150 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1966). See also State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 242, 98
S.E.2d 329, 333 (1957).
The American Law Institute has made similar recommendations in its Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure. MODEL CODE §§ SS 240.2(2), (3), 240.3(l), (3).
"'Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
71d. at 229.
I'ld. at 238 n.29, 247 n.36.
17 1M. at 247 n.36. The North Carolina courts have upheld searches based on the consent of a
person in custody who was not advised of his right to refuse. State v. Brown, 271 N.C. 250, 261,
156 S.E.2d 272, 280 (1967); State v. Hauser, 257 N.C. 158, 159-60, 125 S.E.2d 389, 390 (1962)
(per curiam): cf. State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 297-98, 58 S.E.2d 511, 521 (1968). See also State
v. Little, 270 N.C. 234, 237, 154 S.E.2d 61, 63-64 (1967).
In State v. Accor, 277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970), however, the defendant was taken to
[Vol. 52
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taining consent to search from a person in custody the officers advise
him not only of his right to refuse but also "that he has the right to
consult an attorney, either retained or appointed, before deciding
whether to grant or withhold consent."'
Since other consent situations that require advice of the right to
refuse may not be so easy to anticipate, state legislative policy should
guide the officer by requiring him, as the Commission proposes, to
advise a citizen routinely of his right to refuse a search before obtaining
his consent. 8' In this way, the citizen may be protected against over-
reaching, the officer may be assured that he is not unintentionally invad-
ing the reasonable expectation of privacy of a citizen, and at the same
time the state may be assured the use of any evidence discovered in the
search. Unless law enforcement officers give such advice as a matter of
course, a certain number of consensual searches will probably be over-
turned because of a judicial finding of involuntariness in the consent.
Since the prosecution has the burden of proving voluntariness by clear
and convincing evidence,'82 the straightforward advice recommended by
the Commission will assist the prosecution in meeting that burden.8
3
Since the advice is relatively simple to deliver and could form a part
of the officer's standard procedure, 84 the Commission's recommenda-
tion should be welcome guidance to the police-freeing them from a
complex field inquiry into voluntariness8 5 and establishing a prophylac-
police headquarters without probable cause or a warrant and there asked if he had any objections
to being photographed and fingerprinted. When he said that he did not, his photograph was taken.
The court held:
Although the Miranda warnings were read to him, he was not advised he was free to
leave police headquarters without submitting to the taking of his fingerprints and photo-
graphs. Nothing else appearing it would seem unreasonable under these circumstances
to infer that Moore's response "was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary
taint ....
hI. at 83, 175 S.E.2d at 594-95.
" Proposed § 15A-222(b). Because the request for consent there constitutes a "custodial inter-
rogation," providing the broader advice required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is
well advised.
" 'MODEL CODE, Commentary 193.
"-Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.
543, 548 (1968); State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 579, 180 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1971); State v. Little,
270 N.C. 234, 239, 154 S.E.2d 61, 65 (1967).
"1,See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 230 (1973).
'MODEL CODE, Commentary 194.
'*ln Schneckloh, the Court observed that the "traditional definition of voluntariness we
accept today has always taken into account evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and
the lack of any effective warnings to a person of his rights; and the voluntariness of any statement
taken under those conditions has been carefully scrutinized to determine whether it was in fact
1973]
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tic against the hazard of compelling a consent in circumstances inad-
vertently "instinct with coercion.""1 6
Moreover, the reasons that persuaded the Supreme Court in
Schneckloth to eschew a constitutional command that the advice be
given in every case of a consent search should not have any force in the
development of a suitable state policy. The Schneckloth Court assumed
that if it were to hold that consent to a search constituted a waiver of
constitutional rights, consent could be valid only under the strict stan-
dard for waiver of "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege" established in Johnson v. Zerbst. 1"7 The Court
held that from a constitutional perspective a diluted form of waiver
would be unacceptable.',' The Court decided that "[i]t would be unreal-
istic to expect that in the informal, unstructured context of a consent
search, a policeman, upon pain of tainting the evidence obtained, could
make the detailed type of examination demanded by Johnson."8 9 There-
fore Schneckloth ruled that the strict standard of waiver should apply
only to trial safeguards' 9 and to those pre-trial safeguards that"are
similarly designed to protect the fairness of the trial itself" such as post-
indictment lineups and custodial interrogation.' 9' The Court observed
voluntarily given." 412 U.S. at 248.
See State v. McPeak. 243 N.C. 243, 90 S.E.2d 501 (1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 919 (1956).
In that case, a police ollicer stopped the defendant's automobile on a routine check. He told the
defendant that he would like to search his car, but advised him that" 'he didn't have to let us search
his car if he didn't want to.' " Id. at 244, 90 S.E.2d at 502. The defendant agreed to the search
and in upholding the validity of his consent, the court relied in part on the fact that the defendant
had been advised of his right to refuse. Id. at 246, 90 S.E.2d at 504. But see State v. Craddock,
272 N.C. 160, 163, 169, 158 S.E.2d 25, 27-28, 31-32 (1967) (Two officers with guns drawn stopped
the defendants' automobile, ordered the defendants out of the car and frisked them. After holster-
ing their weapons, the officers requested and received permission to search the trunk. Even after
such a show of force and in the absence of any advice of a right to refuse, the court upheld the
consent.): State v. Williams, 267 N.C. 424, 426, 148 S.E.2d 209, 210 (1966) (At night seven police
officers went to the defendant's house, some to the front and some to the back. The defendant
testified that he was intimidated and frightened. Nevertheless, without explanation the court upheld
a search based on consent given by the defendant at the time without having been advised of his
right to refuse.), cf. State v. Hall, 264 N.C. 559, 562, 142 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1965) ("There is some
question as to the extent the officers left the wife free to consent to the search, or whether the
number of ollicers had a coercive effect sufficient to make her consent involuntary. The circum-
stances did not suggest to her anyting better that she could do in the presence of so much 'law' at
a time when they had her husband in jail.").
I"'Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968).
17304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).





that the protections of the fourth amendment do not qualify for such
treatment because they "have nothing whatever to do with promoting
the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial."' 2 Therefore the strict
standard of Zerbst need not apply.
The legislature may, however, be more flexible. Unrestricted by a
single demanding form of inquiry upon waiver, it may adapt the waiver
procedure to suit "the informal, unstructured context of a consent
search." The Commission's proposal is carefully designed for that con-
text. It demands for the routine search the basic advice of a right to
refuse the search and a statement that anything found may be used in
evidence. More elaborate advice is required if the person whose consent
is sought is in custody. Schneckloth did reaffirm the voluntariness stan-
dard as the test for the validity of a search based on consent and said
that in deciding voluntariness in any particular case it would take into
consideration any advice given in advance of procuring consent. Accord-
ingly, it is in the interest of the state to take precautions to assure that
when its officers do act in reliance upon such consent, the consent was
voluntarily given. The Commission's recommendation would, when fol-
lowed, produce evidence tending to establish voluntariness in every con-
sent search.
D. STOP AND FRISK AND QUESTION
The investigative authority of law enforcement officers to "stop
and frisk and question" involves four legal issues, and the Commission's
proposals treat each separately. The first question is whether and under
what circumstances an officer may stop a person against his will for
investigation. In this regard, the Commission proposal is as follows:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in
the following circumstances, order a person to remain in the officer's
presence near such place:
(1) Persons in suspicious circumstances relating to felonies
and certain misdemeanors.
a. The officer observes circumstances that cause him
reasonably to suspect that the person has just committed
or is about to commit any felony or a misdemeanor
involving danger of bodily injury, and
b. Such action is reasonably necessary to identify the
"21d. at 242.
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person, account for his presence or conduct, or deter-
mine whether to arrest him.
(2) Suspects sought for certain previously committed offen-
ses.
a. The officer has probable cause to believe that a mis-
demeanor involving danger of bodily injury, an escape
from custody, or any felony has been committed, and
b. He reasonably suspects the person may have com-
mitted it; and
c. The action is reasonably necessary to identify the
person to determine whether to arrest him for the crime.
. . . [N]o officer may stop a person who the officers should rea-
sonably know has previously been stopped under this Article unless,
in the period following the prior stop, new circumstances indepen-
dently sufficient to authorize a stop have arisen.
A law enforcement officer may use such force, other than
deadly force, as is reasonably necessary to stop any person or vehicle
or to cause any person to remain in the officer's presence.'
The second question is under what circumstances the person
stopped is entitled to be released from that detention. The proposal
specifies:
A stop authorized by this Article may continue for a period of
time reasonably necessary to accomplish the purposes authorized by
this Article, but in no case for more than 20 minutes . ...
Unless an officer acting under the authority of this Article arrests
a person before the expiration of 20 minutes, the officer must at the
end of that time, release the person and inform him that he is free to
go.194
The third and fourth questions relate to what extent the officer may
search and interrogate the person stopped. The proposal provides for no
investigative search incident to the detention but does authorize a frisk
for dangerous weapons in certain circumstances:
A law enforcement officer who has stopped any person pursuant
to this Article may, if the officer reasonably believes that his safety or
the safety of others then present so requires, search for any dangerous
weapons by an external patting of the person's outer clothing. If in the
course of such a frisk he feels an object which he reasonably believes
"'Proposed §§ 15A-211, -212, -213.
'"'Id. %§ 15A-212, -217.
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to be a dangerous weapon, he may take possession of the object. 9'9 5
The Commission's proposal authorizes questioning of the person
stopped with the following limitations on "sustained questioning":
If a law enforcement officer stops any person who he suspects or
has reasonable cause to suspect may have committed a crime, the
officer must identify himself and advise the person before engaging in
any sustained questioning:
(i) That the person is not obliged to say anything, and any-
thing he says may be used in evidence against him,
(2) That he will not be questioned unless he wishes, and that
he may consult a lawyer or have a lawyer present during
questioning, and that if he is unable to afford a lawyer, one
will be furnished to him prior to questioning, and
(3) That within 20 minutes he will be released unless he is
arrested.'96
The crime prevention function of the stop and frisk authority was
performed until recently under the auspices of vagrancy laws.'97 In order
to provide a flexible response for the officer on the street, however, most
vagrancy statutes employed language that under modern standards is
unconstitutionally vague. 9s North Carolina has been without an en-
forceable vagrancy law since 1969 when a three-judge federal court
declared the state's vagrancy statute unconstitutional.'99 The North Car-
olina Supreme Court has found a common law authority, however, for
police officers "to stop suspicious persons for questioning (field
interrogation and to search those persons for dangerous weapons."20
5Id. § 15A-214.
"Id. § 15A-215.
Section 2 of the Uniform Arrest Act provides as follows:
(I) A peace ollicer may stop any person abroad whom he has reasonable ground to
suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand
of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going.
(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify himself or explain his actions to the
satisfaction of the ollicer may be detained and further questioned and investigated.
(3) The total period of detention provided for by this section shall not exceed two
hours. Such detention is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest in any
ollicial record. At the end of the detention the person so detained shall be released or
be arrested and charged with a crime.
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315, 320-21 (1942).
"See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 124 (1968).
"'Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
''Wheeler v. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C. 1969).
"State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 209, 195 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1973). In 1969, the North
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In Terry v. Ohio2"' and Adams v. Williams"'2 the United States
Supreme Court upheld a police officer's self-protective "stop and frisk"
but held that it was subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment.
In Terry, the attention of a plainclothes officer patrolling an area for
shoplifters and pickpockets was attracted to defendant Terry and a
companion who "didn't look right to me at the time." ' 3 He observed
them while they appeared to be "casing" a store window, met briefly
with a third man, and followed him to the front of a store. Suspicious,
the officer "considered it his job as a police officer to investigate further.
He added that he feared 'they may have a gun.' "I04 He approached the
three, identified himself as a police officer and asked their names. When
they mumbled a response, the officer grabbed defendant Terry "and
patted down the outside of his clothing." ' 5 He felt a gun and took off
Terry's overcoat to remove it. Terry was convicted of unlawful posses-
sion of the concealed weapon.
In Adams v. Williams, the police officer was patrolling alone in a
high crime area at 2:15 a.m. Instead of observing suspicious behavior
himself, he was approached by a person he knew who told him that an
individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a
gun at his waist. After calling for assistance, the officer approached the
car, tapped on the window, and asked the defendant to open the door.
Instead, he rolled down the window. When he did, the officer reached
into the car and removed a loaded revolver from his waistband. The
officer arrested the defendant, searched him, and found heroin.
The Court in Terry held that:
Carolina General Assembly adopted a constitutionally suspect stop and frisk law for riot situations
and for curfew violators. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.10 (1969). It provides as follows:
(a) Any law enforcement officer may frisk any person in order to discover any
dangerous weapon or substance when he has reasonable grounds to believe that the
person is or may become unlawfully involved in an existing riot and when the person is
close enough to such riot that he could become immediately involved in the riot. The
officer may also at that time inspect for the same purpose the contents of any personal
belongings that the person has in his possession.
(b) Any law enforcement officer may frisk any person he finds violating the
provisions of a curfew ... in order to discover whether the person possesses any
dangerous weapon or substance. The officer may also at that time inspect for the same
purpose the contents of any personal belongings that the person has in his possession.
"392 U.S. I (1968).
--407 U.S. 143 (1972).





[T]he Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do
not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime-"arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized
that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his
freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that person. . . .[A] careful
exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or
her body in an attempt to find weapons is . . .a search . . . .It is a
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict
great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be under-
taken lightly."2 '
Having established constitutional control over stop and frisk, Terry
employed alernative rationales for upholding the frisk of Terry and the
subsequent search for the gun. The rationales are important because
they establish the constitutonal limits on this kind of intrusion. The first
rationale was based not on the standards of the fourth amendment but
on the Court's perception of the limitations of the exclusionary rule."'7
Because the objective of the officer in conducting a frisk for weapons is
not to obtain admissible evidence but to protect his own safety, the
Court reasoned, the exclusionary remedy could not have any deterrent
effect.
20
The Court's second ratonale rested on the reasonableness standard
of the fourth amendment. In determining that the frisk was compatible
with substantive constitutional standards, the Court balanced the need
to search against the invasion that the search entails.2 0 A similar balanc-
ing test under the fourth amendment was later used by the Court in
Wyman v. James"' to uphold a warrantless welfare search conducted
without probable cause by a caseworker investigating the eligibility of
a recipient family and the health of a child. The common thread in these
cases is that the search in both was conducted for a purpose other than
discovering evidence of crime. In Wyman, the governmental interest
"'d. at 16-17. "This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on
the streets as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs." Id. at 8-9.
-"7"[T]hc issue is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility against




21-400 U.S. 309 (1971). The Court first held that there was no search, id. at 317-18, then that
even if there was a search it did "not descend to the level of unreasonableness." Id. at 318. See
generallr Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective
.'lnal.1-'is of Supreme Court Action Sinoce Canzara and See, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1011 (1973).
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was the protection and aid of a dependent child.21' In both Terry and
Williams, the Court emphasized that the immediate purpose of the frisk
was the protection of the officer and not the investigation of crime.
1 2
A welfare search and a frisk might incidently uncover criminal evidence,
but doing so is not their objective.'
Since both rationales for the frisk are based on its character as a
"limited protective search for concealed weapons,
'21 it
must, like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation. . . . Thus it must be limited to that which
is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm
the officer or others nearby, and may realistically be characterized as
something less than a "full" search, even though it remains a serious
intrusion.
211
For example, in Sibron v. New York,"'6 the Supreme Court held that
heroin that a police officer found in the defendant's pocket after he saw
the defendant talking with drug addicts was inadmissible evidence. The
Court found the search invalid not only because merely talking to ad-
dicts does not afford a reasonable basis to intrude upon an individual's
personal security, but also because the search was not limited to "the
211400 U.S. at 318-20, 322-23.
212Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972); Terry v.Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 23, 29 (1968).
The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety or Officer McFadden's taking
steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justifi-
cation for McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by searching him for weap-
ons in the course of that investigation. We are now concerned with more than the
governmental interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate
interest of the officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is
dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers'take unnecessary
risks in the performance of their duties.
Terry v. Ohio. supra at 23. See also id. at 24, 29, "[S]uch a search . . . is not justified by any
need to prevent the disappareance or destruction of evidence of crime. . . . The sole justification
for the search in the present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby
. (citations omitted.)
In Williams the Court reemphasized that point: "The purpose of this limited search is not to
discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear or
violence .... ." Adams v. Williams, supra at 146.
However, any evidence uncovered will be admissible at trial. Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S.
143, 148 (1972): Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 67, 79 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 30
(1968).
211Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 23 (1968).
2"Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
2 Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968).
29392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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protection of the officer by disarming a potentially dangerous man". 217
The better practice is probably for the officer to engage in a patdown
search before entering the suspect's clothing,218 and to intrude only if he
feels something resembling a weapon and then only to seize that item.
2 9
In Williams, however, the officer reached directly into the defendant's
waistband where he had been told the gun was being carried, and the
Court held that action to be a reasonably limited intrusion.2
Stop and frisk is new to North Carolina and was judicially sanc-
tioned only this year.22' The North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Streeter2 2 upheld a search under a stop and frisk theory as an alterna-
tive to its principal holding that the search was justified as incident to a
lawful arrest. About 2:45 a.m. two police officers on routine patrol
observed the defendant walking on a highway in a business area. They
stopped their car and began talking to the defendant when one of the
officers saw something bulging from under the defendant's shirt:
The officer then told him'not to move,' and, thinking the bulging
object was a revolver, touched it. It felt like metal. Believing defendant
possessed a gun, the officer reached under defendant's shirttail and
found one pair of gloves, one screwdriver, one hammer, one pry bar,
a flashlight, and one green Wachovia money bag.
223
The officer testified that the object he had touched was the screw-
driver.224 All of the items were admitted in evidence, and the defendant
was convicted of possession of housebreaking tools.
Although there was no evasive action by the defendant upon the
approach of the officer, such as the mumbling response of Terry or the
rolling down of the window instead of opening the door of Williams, the
court upheld the frisk as a limited self-protective search for weapons.
2111d. at 65.
!Ild. at 46, 65, 67; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
"See People v. Collins, I Cal. 3d 658, 463 P.2d 403, 83 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1970). In that case,
on a pat-down frisk the officer felt a lump in the defendant's pants pocket. He reached into the
pocket and removed marijuana. The court held that the search exceeded lawful bounds because
the ollicer did not feel an object that reasonably resembled a weapon. Id. at 660-61, 463 P.2d at
404-05, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81. See Cook, The Art of Frisking, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 789, 797
(1972): Note, Criminal Procedure -Search and Seizure-The Permissible Scope of a Frisk, 48
N.C.L. REv. 110, 115-21 (1969).
mAdams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 146, 147-48 (1973). See also State v. Stanfield 19 N.C. App.
622, 624-25, 199 S.E.2d 741, 743-44 (1973).
2'See note 200 supra.
=283 N.C. 203. 195 S.E.2d 501 (1973).
!Id. at 205, 195 S.E.2d at 504.
2 ld. at 211, 195 S.E.2d at 507 (dissenting opinion).
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The bulge was the specific evidence that entitled the officer to conclude
that the defendant was armed.2 5 The stop in this case, like those in Terry
and Williams, was inextricably a part of the frisk, yet the court in
dictum sanctioned it independently, reasoning that "if the totality of
circumstances affords an officer reasonable grounds to believe that
criminal activity may be afoot, he may temporarily detain the sus-
pect. ' 12  The court then held, "if, after the detention, his personal obser-
vations confirm his apprehension that criminal activity may be afoot
and indicate that the person may be armed, he may then frisk him as a
matter of self-protection.
2 1
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Higgins, joined by Chief Justice
Bobbitt, argued that once the officer removed the screwdriver that had
given him cause to initiate a limited search, he should have desisted from
any further invasion of the defendant's privacy. Thereafter, the dissen-
ters reasoned, the search became exploratory and therefore unconstitu-
tional. 2 8
The reasoning in Terry and Williams would not support a forcible
stop-independently of a frisk-on less than probable cause .22  The
opinions in both cases concerned themselves with the validity of the
frisks and not separately with the validity of a detention of Terry or
Williams.2-1 The officer did not forcibly stop Terry until he spun him
2Id. at 208, 210, 195 S.E.2d at 505, 507.
=6Id. at 210, 195 S.E.2d at 507.
2h1.
-'Id. at 211-12, 195 S.E.2d at 507-08.
-ln Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court declined to consider the question
whether a police ollicer may use force to stop a pedestrian on the basis of a probable cause standard
less demanding than for an arrest when it refused to test a detention provision in the New Yok
stop and frisk law. The Court explained:
It is not apparent, for example, whether the power to "stop" granted by the statute
entails a power to "detain" for investigation or interrogation upon less than probable
cause, or if so what sort of durational limitations. . . are contemplated. And while the
statute's apparent grant of a power of compulsion indicates that many "stops" will
constitute "seizures," it is not clear that all conduct analyzed under the rubric of the
statute will either rise to the level of a "seizure" or be based upon less than probable
cause ....
We cannot tell, for example, whether the officer's power to "demand" of a person
an "explanation of his actions" contemplates either an obligation on the part of the
citizen to answer or some additional power on the part of the officer in the event of a
refusal to answer, or even whether the interrogation following the stop is "custodial."
Id. at 60 n.20.
'ld. at 23. See also id. at 35 (White, J., concurring); Cook. Varieties of Detention and the
Fourth Anendnent. 23 ALA. L. REV. 287, 302, 303 (1971): LaFave,supra note 197, at 63-64; Note.
The Limits of Stop and Frisk -Questons Unanswered by Terry, 10 ARMZ. L. REV. 419. 423 (1968).
[Vol. 52
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
around for the frisk. At that time the officer had only identified himself
and asked Terry to do the same. He had not exercised an, restraint of
Terry's movements although Terry probably understood simply from
the officer's approach that he was expected to remain in the officer's
presence. In Williams the officer used even less restraint on the defen-
dant before thrusting his hand into his waist. In both cases the Court
recognized that an officer with a suspicion of criminal activity not
amounting to probable cause may have a duty to investigate short of
conducting an arrest or body search. In Williams the Court said "[a]
brief stop of a suspicious individual in order to determine his identity
or maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more informa-
tion, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer
at the time."' 1 In neither case did the Court hold that an officer could
use force for that purpose.
Those cases authorized a frisk only for the purpose of disarming
an apparent threat to the safety of the officer. In Williams the Court
reiterated its emphasis in Terry that the frisk procedure won constitu-
tional approval because it did not have as its objective the investigation
of crime. The Court first decided-for reasons strictly related to the
non-investigatory nature of the search-that a limited intrusion would
be permitted. It then carefully circumscribed the scope of the intrusion
in accordance with its protective purpose. The limited nature of the
intrusion was not the reason for permitting it-that was just the scope
of the search that the Court's rationale would tolerate. By contrast, an
investigative detention is subject to the sanction of the exclusionary rule
because the police objective is to develop evidence of criminal activity.
Also in such a situation the balance of the fourth amendment favors
the state's interest in investigation only when it is weighted with proba-
ble cause. The Court indicated its concern in this direction in Sibron v.
New York, 2 2 a companion case to Terry. In Sibron the Court declined
to evalute the stop authority in a New York statute, in part on the
ground that "it is impossible to tell whether the standard of 'reasonable
suspicion' connotes the same sort of specificity, reliability, and objectiv-
ity which is the touchstone of permissible governmental action under the
Fourth Amendment.
' ' 3
Several members of the Court, including two presently sitting Jus-
2"Adamis v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
-2392 U.S. 40 (1968).
21h1. at 60-61 n.20.
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tices, had occasion to express their individual views on this subject in
Wainwright v. City of New Orleans.214 The Court dismissed the writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted, but Justices Harlan, Fortas, and
Marshall, in concurring opinions, and Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Douglas, in dissenting opinions, indicated that the traditional standard
of probable cause is required even for the temporary detention of a
person if it is effected forcibly.
In Wainwright, two police officers noticed the petitioner about
midnight and thought he fit the description of a man wanted for murder
known to have a tattoo on his arm reading "born to raise hell". When
the officers approached him, petitioner identified himself and his pur-
pose for being on the street. He refused, however, to show them his
forearm. He "was then suffering from a skin ailment which he appar-
ently regarded as unsightly and which would have been exposed had he
removed his jacket, though he did not communicate this to the po-
lice." ?- Peacefully petitioner tried to walk away three times. The offi-
cers prevented him from doing so and arrested him for vagrancy, resist-
ing arrest, and reviling the police. At the police station, petitioner again
refused to remove his jacket, and a scuffle ensued as the officers re-
moved it. Petitioner had no tattoo on his arm, but he was convicted of
charges arising out of the station house incident, the only charges pur-
sued against him.
Justice Harlan concurred in the dismissal of the petition because
the record was "too opaque" to permit a decision as to "whether the
petitioner used an unreasonable amount of force in resisting what on
this record must be regarded as an illegal attempt by the police to search
his person." 2a6 If the original detention of the petitioner had been law-
ful, however, his resistance would have justified the officers in arresting
him and removing his jacket at the station. Therefore, Justice Harlan
must have questioned the validity of the stop on the street.
Justice Fortas, writing an opinion in which Justice Marshall joined,
was more explicit. "I should want to know," he wrote, "whether, in fact,
there was constitutionally adequate cause for the police to suspect that
the pedestrian was the man sought for murder."2"7 In his judgment the
record was too sketchy to decide that question, and he therefore voted
to dismiss the writ. He did not define "constitutionally adequate cause."
"392 U.S. 598 (1968).





Chief Justice Warren wrote that probable cause was necessary for
the initial detention.2 38 Justice Douglas agreed.29
The Commission's proposal authorizes the use of force to stop a
vehicle as well as a pedestrian. Terry and Sibron involved only persons
on foot; Williams involved the frisk of a person sitting in a parked car
without the motor running. The Supreme Court cases involving automo-
bile detentions are even more clear in their insistence upon probable
cause.
Because of the exigent circumstances, a search of a mobile vehicle
may be conducted without a warrant. Every United States Supreme
Court case approving such a warrantless search, however, has empha-
sized the need for probable cause.2 14 In a number of cases, the Court has
held the probable cause requirement applicable to the halting of a car
as well as the search of it.24' The 1949 decision in Brinegar v. United
States242 in an instructive example.
In Brinegar, two federal officers saw the defendant drive past them
at a point five miles west of the Missouri-Oklahoma line. The officers
knew that Missouri was a ready source of supply for liquor and the dry
state of Oklahoma was a good market for it. One of the officers had
arrested the defendant on an earlier occasion for the illegal transporta-
tion of liquor, knew his reputation for hauling liquor, and had seen him
loading liquor in Missouri twice during the previous six months. On this
occasion, the defendant's car appeared weighted down. As it passed the
1l. at 604, 606.
"Id. at 612-13, 615.
-'"Almcida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2537-38 (1973): Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 458 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48, 49 (1970): Dyke v.
Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1968); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 170, 176-77 (l949);Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 (1931); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 159-60 (1925). See also State v. Simmons, 278 N.C. 468, 471, 180 S.E.2d 97, 99
(1971).
!"This principle was expressed in a classic statement in the landmark case of Carroll v. United
States. 267 U.S. 132 (1925):
It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to
stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons
lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search. Travel-
lers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self-
protection . . . .But those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public high-
ways. have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known
to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their
vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.
Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added).
2-?338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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officers it sped up and attempted to elude them. When the officers
finally stopped the defendant's car, the defendant told them he was
carrying liquor. The officers searched and found it.
The Court held that the information available to the officers before
stopping the car constituted probable cause243 after saying that "[t]he
troublesome line posed by the facts in . . . this case is one between mere
suspicion and probable cause. 244 Concurring specially, Justice Burton
took a position supporting authority to stop a car for investigation on
less than probable cause. He then believed that the defendant's admis-
sion of his contraband cargo during the inestigative interrogation estab-
lished the probable cause for the search. The majority, however, dec-
lined that approach and in its painstaking analysis of the facts giving
rise to probable cause eschewed reliance on the admission obtained after
the stop.
In dissent, Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Murphy and Frank-
furter, disagreed with the finding of probable cause and amplified on the
lack of a stop authority short of probable cause:
I do not, of course, contend that officials may never stop a car
on the highway without the halting being considered an arrest or a
search. Regulations of traffic, identifications where proper, traffic cen-
sus, quarantine regulations, and many other causes give occasion to
stop cars in circumstances which do not imply arrest or charge of
crime.2 14 And to trail or pursue a suspected car to its destination, to
2'1ld. at 176-77.
2
1'd. at 176.2"Justice Jackson's examples are consistent with the balancing test rationale of Terry and
WIrnan crediting the government's interest more heavily on the scales if its objective is unrelated
except incidentally to a criminal invstigation.
In State v. Allen, 282 N.C. 503, 194 S.E.2d 9 (1973), the North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld under motor vehicle regulations an investigative detention of an automobile without requir-
ing it to conform to probable cause standards. The officers had reason to be suspicious of the
occupants of the vehicle, having seen them run to a car from behind bushes in a deserted business
area at 2:00 a.m. After stopping the car, the officers frisked the occupants for weapons and found
none. With the consent of the driver one of the officers started to look for the registration card in
the glove compartment and saw a money bag with the name of a nearby business on it. When the
ollicer mentioned finding the bag, the driver started running. He was caught and both defendants
were arrested.
The court upheld the stop of the vehicle only on the theory that the officers were attempting
"to determine the validity and presence of the driver's license and registration card. G.S. 20-183
(a): G.S. 20-57 .... ." Id. at 507, 194 S.E.2d at 13. Those statutes provide that an automobile
registration card must at all times be carried in the vehicle, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-57 (1965), and
that law enforcement "officers within their respective jurisdisdictions shall have the power to stop
any motor vehicle upon the highways of the state for the purpose of determining whether the same
is being operated in violation of any of the provisions of this article." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183(a)
[Vol. 52
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observe it and keep it under surveillance,is not in itself an arrest nor a
search. But when a car is forced off the road, summoned to stop by a
siren, and brought to a halt under such circumstances as are here
disclosed, we think the officers are then in the position of one who has
entered a home: the search at its commencment must be valid and
cannot be saved by what it turns up.' 6
The Court reiterated that rule in Henry v. United States.247 The
(1965). Reasoning that "a routine license check and the concomitant delay does not constitute an
arrest in the legal sense," State v. Allen, supra at 509, 194 S.E.2d at 14, the court held that the
statute constitutionally authorized a stop for that purpose without probable cause.
In Cady v. Dombrowski, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2527-28 (1973), the United States Supreme Court
said:
The contact with vehicles by federal law enforcement officers usually, if not always,
involves the detection or investigation of crimes unrelated to the operation of a vehicle
As a result of our federal system of government, however, state and local police
ollicers, unlike federal officers, have much more contact with vehicles for reasons related
to the operation of vehcles themselves. All States require vehicles to be registered and
operators to be icensed. States and localities have enacted extensive and detailed codes
regulating the condition and manner in which motor vehicles may be operated on pubic
streets and highways.
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also because
or the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident
on public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving automobiles will be
substantially greater than police-citizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts
will occur because the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute,
hut many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal officers,
frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability
and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretak-
ing functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.
In Cadr. the Court upheld the search of an automobile that had been involved in an accident, was
in a position constituting a nuisance on the highway, and whose owner was intoxicated and later
comatose because it was done for motor vehicle safety purposes unrelated to criminal investigation.
In Allen, the North Carolina Supreme Court purported to apply a similar principle: "We
believe the provisions of G.S. 20-183(a) when balanced with the State's highway obligation to
preserve order and enforce safety on its streets and highways, do not constitute such an encroach-
ment on the individual's constitutional rights as to render the statute invalid." State v. Allen, supra
at 511, 194 S.E.2d at 15. The difficulty with this holding in Allen is that the court was not as careful
as the Supreme Court in Cady to explain why the detention of the automobile was for non-criminal-
investigation purposes. On the facts of Allen, it is evident that the officers were investigating
suspected burglaries and not a motor vehicle offense. By applying a statute authorizing detention
ofrn car for motor vehicle purposes to uphold an investigative search, the North Carolina Supreme
Court was approving a ruse that would enable a police officer to detain any car for a crime
investigation. See People v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d 449, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970);
State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 237 A.2d 683 (1968).
-'1338 U.S. at 188.
'17361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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employer of a man named Pierotti gave FBI agents information of an
undisclosed nature implicating Pierotti with thefts from interstate ship-
mnents. The agents saw Pierotti and the defendant drive from a bar to a
house, pick up cartons, put them in their car, return to the bar, and then
repeat the process. The officers stopped the car. As they approached
they heard the defendant say, "'Hold it; it is the G's.' This was followed
by, 'Tell him he [you] just picked me up.' ,,248 Upon searching the car,
the agents found cartons of stolen merchandise. The Court held:
The prosecution conceded . . . that the arrest took place when the
federal agents stopped the car. That is our view on the facts of this
case. When the officers interrupted the two men and restricted their
liberty of movement, the arrest, for purposes of this particular case,
was complete. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether at or
before that time they had reasonable cause to believe that a crime had
been committed. 49
To emphasize the point the Court added: "Under our system suspi-
cion is not enough for an officer to lay hands on a citizen."25
These cases reinforce the conclusion that a street as well as a vehi-
cle stop may not be forcibly effected without probable cause. 2. , "Noth-
ing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent
wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether
these intrusions be termed 'arrests' or 'investigatory detentions.' ",252 The
constitutional minimum of probable cause for a detention does not
mean that police officers must solve the case before they can investigate
it or that the frisk authority is useless. Police officers may approach any
person on the street, suspect or witness, and direct questions to him. '
21ld. at 99.
21/d. at 103. Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren dissented from the statement that the
stopping of the car amounted to an arrest. Id. at 106. See also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253 (1960).
The commentary to the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure argued that Henry is not
authoritative because of the Government's concession. MODEL CODE, Commentary 108 n. 14. The
Court's quoted language clearly establishes, however, that it accepted the concession only to fortify
a conclusion it had reached independently.
:"Hcnry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). See also State v. Robinson, 15 N.C. App.
155. 156, 189 S.E.2d 567, 568 (1972).
-'But see Cook, supra note 230, at 292-94.
'2Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969).
5ln Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966), the Supreme Court approved "the
traditional function of police ollicers in investigating crime [by] [g]eneral on-the-scene questioning
as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process
. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.35 (1968) (White, J., concurring); Note, 10 ARIZ. L. REv., supra
note 230 at 424, 427.
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Most persons will feel a civic responsibility to cooperate with the offi-
cers, but those who find it intrusive, inconvenient, embarrasing, disturb-
ing,-or incriminating-need not do so. To protect himself in such an
encounter, the officer may conduct a frisk if he has reason to believe
such a precaution is necessary for his safety. Beyond that, however, he
may not detain a citizen against his will unless he has probable cause
to arrest.
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure recommended a
stop authority2'' even though the empirical research discussed in its
commentary demonstrated that
2"The Model Code makes the following recommendations regarding stop and frisk:
(I) Cave's in Which Stop is Authorized.
A law enforcement officer, lawfully present in any place, may, in the follow-
ing circumstances, order a person to remain in the officer's presence near such
place for such period as is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purposes authorized in this subsection, but in no case for more than twenty
minutes:
(a) Persons in suspicious circumstances relating to certain misdemeanors
and filonies.
(i) Such person is observed in circumstances such that the officer
reasonably suspects that he has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a misdemeanor or felony, involving danger of forcible
injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, and
(ii) such action is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify the
identilication of such person, to obtain or verify an account of such
person's presence or conduct, or to determine whether to arrest such
person.
(b) Witnesses near scene of certain misdemeanors and felonies.
(i) The officer has reasonable cause to believe that a misde-
meanor or felony, involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of
appropriation of or damage to property, has just been committed near
the place wherehe finds such person, and
(ii) the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person
has knowledge of material aid in the investigation of such crime, and
(iii) such action is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify the
identification of such person, or to obtain an account of such crime.
(c) Suspects sought for certain previously committed felonies.
(i) The officer has reasonable cause to believe that a felony
involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of
or damage to property has been committed, and
(ii) he reasonably suspects such person may have committed it,
and
(iii) such action is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify the
identification of such person for the purpose of determining whether
to arrest him for such felony.
(3) Use of Force. In order to exercise the authority conferred in subsections (I)
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[t]here is solid factual basis for the belief that where the stop (and also
less clearly coercive exercises of authority such as harsh and peremp-
tory demands for information) are widely used, this is a source of great
resentment and a major cause of hostile attitudes towards the police. '
The Reporters concluded, however, that there was no "objective empiri-
cal evidence as to (1) the degrees of such abuse, (2) the situations in
which such abuse occurs, or (3) the situations in which the stop and frisk
and (2) of this section, a law enforcement officer may use such force, other than deadly
force. as is reasonably necessary to stop any person or vehicle or to cause any person to
remain in the officer's presence.
(4) Frisk for Dangerous Weapons. A law enforcement officer who has stopped any
person pursuant to this section may, if the officer reasonably believes that his safety or
the safety of others then present so requires, search for any dangerous weapon by an
external patting of such person's outer clothing. If in the course of such search he feels
an object which he reasonably believes to be a dangerous weapon, he may take such
action as is necessary to examine such object.
(5) Questoning of Suspects.
(a) Warnings. If a law enforcement officer stops any person who he sus-
pects or has reasonable cause to suspect may have committed a crime, the officer
shall warn such person as promptly as is reasonable under the circumstances, and
in any case before engaging in any sustained questioning
(i) that such person is not obliged to say anything, and anything
he says may be used in evidence against him,
(ii) that within twenty minutes he will be released unless he is
arrested. [,]
(iii) that if he is arrested he will be taken to a police station
where he may promptly communicate by telephone with counsel, rela-
tives or friends, and
(iv) that he will not be questioned unless he wishes, and that if
he wishes to consult a lawyer or have a lawyer present during question-
ing, he will not be questioned at this time, and that after being taken
to the statonhouse a lawyer will be furnished him prior to questioning
if he is unable to obtain one.]
(b) Limitations on Questioning. No law enforcement officer shall question
a person detained pursuant to the authority in this section who he suspects or
has reasonable cause to suspect may have committed a crime, if such person has
indicated in any manner that he does not wish to be questioned, or that he wishes
to consult counsel before submitting to any questioning.
(6) Action to Be Taken After Period of Stop. Unless an officer acting hereunder
arrests a person during the time he is authorized by subsections (I) and (2) of this section
to require such person to remain in his presence, he shall, at the end of such time, inform
such prson that he is free to go.
(7) Records Relating to Persons Stopped. In accordance with regulations to be
issued pursuant to Section 10.03, a law enforcement officer, who has ordered any person
to remain in his presence pursuant to this section, shall with reasonable promptness
thereafter make a record of the circumstances and purposes of the stop.
MODEL CODE § 110.2.
"5MODEL CODE. Commentary 114.
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are clearly necessary and reasonable. '256
Even if a forcible stop on information short of probable cause
might be constitutionally permissible in emergency circumstances, the
Commission's proposal is not carefully drawn for such circumstances
and is broad enough to install the forcible stop as a routine procedure.
The forcible stop is authorized for investigation of "any felony or a
misdemeanor involving danger of bodily injury,' 257 not only if such an
offense has just been committed or is about to be committed, 25s but also
if it is a stale crime.2"9 The "any felony" standard would include not only
crimes immediately threatening to life or property, but also crimes such
as narcotics offenses.2 0 The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
concluded from its empirical studies "that the stop and frisk is not as
useful an enforcement technique in respect to narcotics offenses as it
might be in respect to"2' 1 crimes "involving in the particular case a
direct threat to persons or peroperty. ' 212 Terry approved a frisk in the
course of an investigation of possible burglaries. Sibron involved two
cases: the Court approved a frisk in an investigation of a possible bur-
glary; it disapproved a frisk in an investigation of a possible narcotics
offense, although not expressly for that reason. Williams approved a
frisk in an investigation of a possible narcotics offense but at the same
time a possible weapons offense. The dissenting justices in Williams
argued that even the frisk authority of Terry should not apply to narcot-
ics offenses.
The Commission's proposal would allow a stop in all cases on the
basis of "reasonable suspicion"."' The Supreme Court has already
criticized that standard in the forcible stop context because of uncer-
tainty whether it "connotes the same sort of specificity, reliability, and
25'Id. at 116-17.
2'Proposed § 15A-21 l(1)(a), 2(a).
2;Id.
-1d. § 15A-211(2)(a).
-'.See La Fave, supra note 197, at 65-66.
Even in the context of a frisk rather than a stop the Supreme Court in Terry demanded a
"narrowly drawn authority." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
2'MODEL CODE, Commentary 118.
"'2MODEL CODE, Commentary 117.
2-The actual language is, "circumstances that cause him reasonably to suspect," Proposed
§ 15A-21 I(1)(a), and "reasonably suspects," id. § 15A-21 l(2)(b). If the stop is for a previously
committed offense, the officer must have probable cause to believe that the offense was committed.
Id. § 15A-211(2)(a). If the stop is for a recent offense, the reasonable suspicion standard applies.
Id. § 15A-21 l(l)(a). In both cases, only the reasonable suspicion standard applies to the involve-
ment of the suspect in the crime. Id. k§ 15A-21 l(1)(a), (2)(b).
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objectivity which is the touchstone of permissible governmental action
under the Fourth Amendment." '264 Probable cause is not an exacting
standard; it is workable and flexible. It does not demand conclusive
proof; its concern is with reasonableness.21 5 It is not a casual phrase but
is engraved in the fourth amendment as the only standard for a search
endorsed by the Constitution. Since probable cause calls for an ap-
praisal of whether a confluence of facts justify an assessment of criminal
activity made by a reasonable man, what can "reasonable suspicion"
be? Probable cause may be found in the word of an underworld informer
only if it is reliable or corroborated; may "reasonable suspicion" be
found without indicia of reliability? 6 Are "area detentions" of persons
in high crime areas at prime crime times contemplated?6 ' The constitu-
tional standard authorizes police investigation whenever there is proba-
ble cause. Yet when investigation is the purpose of an intrusion into
privacy, probable cause is a prerequisite; even a frisk "is not justified,"
as the Court said in Terry, "by any need to prevent the disappearance
or destruction of evidence of crime.
'2 68
The proposed procedure for questioning detained suspects illus-
trates the confusion about the stop authority. It requires that the
Miranda advice be delivered to a suspect before the officer engages "in
any sustained questioning. '29 This vagary betrays the Commission's
-"Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968). But see reference to "the 'reasonable suspicion'
found sullicient for a street detention and weapons search in Terry v. Ohio . . . and Adams v.
Williams . . . ." in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2537 (1973).
-'GBrinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). See also Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
2"Cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1972). The officer in Williams relied on a
highly specific tip by an informer known to him who had previously given information regarding
homosexuality, not drugs or guns. in addition, however, the Court relied in approving the frisk on
the fact that the defendant, when asked to open his door, rolled down his window instead. Although
this might be explained because the defendant did not hear the officer and rolled down the window
to remove that obstruction to communication, the Court held that the officer reasonably considered
that as a result his safety was more precarious because he could not readily see the defendant's
movements.
2-7See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 2535, 2542-43, 2545 (1973). In a concurring
opinion, Justice Powell suggested that "there may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of
probable cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border areas," id. at 2542-43, "where the
concentration of illegally-present aliens is high," id. at 2542. Justice Powell, it is important to note,
emphasized that this is another search situation not involving crime investigation, id. at 2542, and
thus believed this to be another appropriate case for the Terry- Wyman balancing approach, id. at
2545. See also See v. City 6f Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 534-35, 536-37 (1967). But see Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27, 728 (1969).
-rTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).




confusion about what kind of concept it is creating with its stop author-
ity.
Miranda requires that its advice be given in every case of "custodial
interrogation,"' ' 0 that is, "when an individual is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant
way."12 '1 This may occur in a person's own home as well as in the police
station.2 12 Terry held that in fourth amendment contemplation "when-
ever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has 'seized' that person. ' 273 Thus, the conclusion appears
inescapable that if a forcible stop under the Commission's proposal is
to be followed by questioning, the Miranda advice must be given before
any interrogation begins.2 14 "Sustained questioning" is therefore an ir-
relevant consideration; the advice is required before any questioning.
The Commission seems to have been struggling with a hybrid character-
ization of the forcible stop: at its inception and during preliminary
questioning, though forcibly restrained the suspect is not in custody. At
some hazily conceived juncture defined in terms of the duration of the
questioning alone and without regard to any other circumstances in the
encounter-such as the display of force, the resistance or resentment
expressed by the suspect, or the nature of the information being gath-
ered by the officers-the stop is either abruptly converted or gradually
develops into a custody.
This formulation illustrates that the objective of the Commission
would be more comfortable in a different posture, one abandoning reli-
ance on any variety of actionable information less than probable cause.
A police officer who approaches an individual on the street with less
than probable cause need not deliver the Miranda advice before talking
to him. Neither may he communicate any coercive restraints upon that
person's freedom. If that person at any time chooses to depart the
officer's company, the officer must permit him to do so unless he arrests
him and has probable cause for that action. If an officer approaches an
individual on the street with probable cause he would be well-advised
to recite the Miranda advice to the suspect before embarking on any
interrogation,27 " whether he arrests the person at that time or not. If the
-"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 467, 469, 471 (1966).
"Id. at 478.
--Oro/co v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969). See also Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. I (1968).
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 16 (1968).
-'CT. La Fave, supra note 197, at 95-101.
"See MODEL CODE § 110.2(5).
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suspect attempts to leave, the officer may arrest him and thus force him
to stay in his presence. The officer need not remove the suspect to the
police station immediately 26 but may continue his investigation on the
street. If the officer desires to investigate by further interrogation of the
suspect, he must provide the Miranda advice and afford the suspect his
rights to silence and to counsel if he desires to exercise them. If after
continuing his investigation, the officer's belief in the suspect's guilt of
a crime has been assuaged, he may forthwith release him.
The commentary to the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
dure argued that a stop authority was necessary because in confused,
emergency situations a police officer needs an "opportunity to 'freeze'
the situation for a short time, so that he may make inquiry and arrive
at a considered judgment about further action to be taken."7 Further-
more, the Commentary argued that
the arrest decision has important consequences. The arrested person
is taken to a police station and his arrest recorded; he may be detained
for a period of hours or he may be held to appear in court. The Code,
following existing law, requires a substantial degree of certainty for
this decison. Such a requirement of substantial certainty is sensible
only in view of the availability of the authority in this section, for it is
unrealistic to expect a police officer in the field to exercise a reasonable
judgment as to whether or not to make an arrest always the very
moment that he is first aware that he is in the presence of a critical
situation. Without a limited "stop" power there will surely be pressure
to relax the "reasonable cause" standard for arrest to enable the police
to exercise some authority in suspicious circumstances, circumstances
which should not give rise to the range of serious consquences of an
arrest but which will do so in the absence of a more limited available
alternative. Without an authority to stop, there are likely to be more
arrests on a lesser basis, and what is more important more arrests of
innocent persons.2Y8
The concerns expressed in that argument are legitimate, but their
persuasiveness is undermined when it is realized that not all arrests need
involve the inconvenience to the suspect and the officer of a trip to the
station house. Arrest need not abort the investigation at the scene either.
In this perspective, the fourth amendment already provides for the law
enforcement needs pressuring for a stop authority and does so within
2"(f. Proposed § 15A-302 (providing for a citation in lieu of arrest for a misdemeanor).
"'MODEL CODE, Commentary 112-13.
""d. at 113.
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its standard probable cause procedure. Thus, if a police officer does not
have probable cause to detain a person, it is unreasonable to allow him
to do so. If he does have probable cause, he may effect a detention that,
under the fourth amendment, is a "seizure" or an "arrest". Yet he still
retains all the flexibility of a "stop" since he may release the suspect
upon satisfying himself of his innocence. In that situation and also in
connection with any non-coercive citizen contact, if the officer has a
reasonable basis for belief that his safety may be in jeopardy because
the person with whom he is dealing is armed and dangerous, he may
conduct a limited frisk to protect himself. Legitimate law enforcement
needs are therefore satisfied while individual privacy is respected.
E. No-KNOCK ENTRIES
The requirement 29 that law enforcement officers announce their
authority and purpose before making a forcible entry into private prem-
ises (popularized by the Hollywood call to "Open up in the name of the
law") encourages courteous police conduct and enables a person in
possession of the premises to admit the officers peaceably. It thereby
protects the privacy of the occupants29 and mitigates the risk of viol-
ence2' and property damage.
2
2
'For a history of the law regarding the requirement of notice of authority and purpose before
entering a dwelling to conduct a search and seizure, see Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301,
306-08 (1958): Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456, 460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Blakey, The Rule
o f Annoncenent and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 499. 500-08 (1964); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 139-44
(1970).
2U"The requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home
is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application. Congress . . .has
declared . . . the reverence of the law for the individual's right of privacy in his house." Miller v.
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963)
(dissenting opinion); State v. Covington, 273 N.C. 690, 697, 161 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1968); Note, 80
YALE L.J., supra note 279, at 141.
2"Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 (1968) ("[Alnother facet of the rule of an-
nouncement was, generally, to safeguard officers, who might be mistaken, upon an unannounced
intrusion into a home, for someone with no right to be there."); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
57-58 (1963) ("IThe requirement of awareness also serves to minimize the hazards of the officers'
dangerous calling."): Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 n.12 (1958) ("[C]ompliance is also
a safeguard for the police themselves who might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot down by a
fearful householder."). McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948) (Jackson & Frankfurter,
JJ., concurring). In that case Justice Jackson wrote:
Many homeowners in this crime-beset city doubtless are armed. When a woman sees a
man in plain clothes, prying up her bedroom window and climbing in, her natural
impulse would be to shoot. A plea of justifible homicide might result awkwardly for
enforcement officers. But an officer seeing a gun drawn on him might shoot first. Under
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It has been argued that the announcement rule does not afford any
substantial protection to privacy because once the notice is given, entry
must always be permitted:
If the door is locked, he may be able to avoid a broken door by
responding to the demand for entry. If he is engaged in private activi-
ties, perhaps of a carnal nature, or is otherwise indisposed, he may
have time to avoid embarrassment-but not interruption. Or if he is
asleep, he will be spared the possible shock of awakening to the sight
of a stranger in his home (entry by stealth), or of awakening to the
sound of a breaking door.2
The surprise character of the entry may not be as great an intrusion
upon privacy as the entry itself, but the frightening aspects of the inva-
sion are exacerbated by its forcible or stealthy nature. The recent highly
publicized drug raids in which members of a federal drug abuse law
enforcement "strike force" reportedly terrorized two innocent families
in Collinsville, Illinois with evening "no-knock" searches dramatize that
point."84 The unannounced searches were apparently conducted on the
basis of uncorroborated tips, without warrants, and at the wrong houses.
But the rude and brutal manner in which they were allegedly carried out
constituted an invasion of privacy beyond that accomplished by the fact
of the search alone. 
2 85
the circumstances of this case, I should not want the task of convincing a jury that it
was not murder.
I. at 460-61. State v. Covington, 273 N.C. 690, 697, 161 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1968): Siegel, New
York Frisk and Knock-Not Statutes: Are They Constitutional?, 30 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274, 278
(1968): Note, 80 YALE L.J., supra note 279, at 141.
In State v. Miller, 282 N.C. 633, 194 S.E.2d 353 (1973), fourteen or fifteen plainclothes
Charlotte police officers conducting a gambling raid entered through an open rear door without
any announcement. As they entered the card room, the police claimed one of them said, "Police,
police. Sit down." The defendant, who said he never heard the word "police" mentioned, testified
that he heard a noise like a door being kicked down and saw men enter with guns. Thinking a
robbery was in progress, he pulled a pistol and said, "hold it." One officer pointed a gun at the
defendant and the defendant heard a shot. He then ducked into a bathroom and started shooting,
killing one officer. When he heard the officers say they were police, he came out of the bathroom.
After the defendant's conviction for murder was reversed for other reasons by the North
Carolina Supreme Court, he was retried and acquitted. Charlotte Observer, June 12, 1973, at IA,
col. I. Superior Court Judge Frank W. Snepp, who presided at the retrial, criticized the police
from the bench for failing to identify their authority and purpose before entry, and also for brutal
beatings they inflicted afterwards on the suspected gamblers. Id. at IA, col. I, 6A, col. 1.
"Note, 80 YALE L.J., supra note 279, at 142.
'Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense. An Alleged Constitutional Problen, 44
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 626, 647 (1970).
*'SNEWSWEEK,'May 14, 1973, at 45; N.Y. Times, May 2, 1973, at 8. col. 3.
2'After the raids, an aide to Senator Charles Percy of Illinois told the press that "there
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The potential for violence further aggravates the invasion of pri-
vacy. A householder is lawfully entitled to defend his home against an
unannounced police intrusion, if he is unaware of the authority of the
intruders.28" In such a situation the householder must persuade a jury
that he was under a reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily
harm at the hands of the intruding officer and that he did not use
excessive force in repelling the intrusion.287 The householder's right to
privacy encompasses a right to security from police search techniques
that are unnecessarily fraught with potential for violence.28
On the other hand, dispensing with the requirement of notice re-
duces the time in which occupants might escape, destroy or dispose of
evidence, or mount a violent response to the attempted entry.289 The
time saved will usually be less than a minute, the time it takes to make
the announcement and allow a reasonable opportunity for the occupants
to grant admittance.21 "The burden of making an express announce-
appears to he growing Senate support for the view that 'the mere existence' of legal authority for
no-knock raids encourages abuse." Asheville Times, July 17, 1973, at 5, col.
"Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 49 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
When a trespasser enters upon a man's premises, makes an assault upon his dwell-
ing and attempts to force an entrance into his house in a manner such as would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that the intruder intends to commit a felony or to
inflict some serious personal injury upon the inmates, a lawful occupant of the dwelling
may legally prevent the entry even by the taking of the life of the intruder . . . .The
rules governing the right to defend one's habitation against forcible entry by an intruder
are substantially the same as those governing his right to defend himself.
State v. Miller, 267 N.C. 409, 411, 148 S.E.2d 279, 281-82 (1966). See also State v. Baker, 222
N.C. 428, 430, 23 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1942).
This principle has been applied where the intruder was a law enforcement officer and there
was evidence that the officer did not give notice of his authority or purpose. State v. Sparrow, 276
N.C. 499, 512, 173 S.E.2d 897, 905-06 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971); State v. Heckstall,
268 N.C. 208, 209, 150 S.E.2d 213, 215 (1966). See also Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614
(1894): Booth v. State, 22 Ala. App. 508, 177 So. 492 (1928); State v. Lowman, 134 S.C. 485, 133
S.E. 457 (1926). Farmer v. Sellers, 89 S.C. 492, 72 S.E. 224 (1911); Lauder v. State, 119 Tex.
Crim. 438, 44 S.W.2d 719 (1931).
2'State v. Miller, 267 N.C. 409, 411, 148 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1966); State v. Baker, 222 N.C.
428, 431, 23 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1942); Morris v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Ky. 1967).
2"The right to privacy also includes restrictions on the scope of a search once one is lawfully
undertaken. Cupp v. Murphy, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 2003-05 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 467 (1971): Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-
18, 25-26, 29-30 (1968).
!"E.g.. United States v. Garcia Mendez, 437 F.2d 85, 86 (5th Cir. 1971). The officers sur-
rounded the defendant's house and through his bedroom window saw him asleep with an automatic
revolver inches from his side. One officer maintained a watch on the defendant, while the others
broke in. The court held that the failure to give notice was justified by the peril to the officers
caused by the drawn weapon.21"The length of time an officer must wait before breaking in to serve a valid warrant must
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ment is certainly slight.""'' There are, however, circumstances in which
the Constitution and the common law recognize the need for unan-
nounced entries and permit searching or arresting officers the advantage
of surprise.
In Ker v. California11 the United States Supreme Court had its
only opportunity to discuss "no-knock" on a constitutional level. The
issue in Ker was whether the facts established a constitutionally accepta-
ble exception to the notice requirement. The Court implied that ordinar-
ily failure to comply with the notice requirement would violate the
fourth amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,"2 13 but held that the flexibility in the reasonableness standard
permitted dispensing with the notice requirement under the facts in that
case.2
94
In Ker, police officers observed one of the defendants under cir-
cumstances giving them probable cause to believe that he had just been
involved in a marijuana transaction. "Soon thereafter Ker drove away
and the officers followed him but lost him when he made a U-turn in
the middle of the block and drove in the opposite direction. 2 15 The
officers proceeded to the defendant's apartment building after obtaining
the address through motor vehicle registration records and saw the car
that they had been following in the building parking lot.
The officers obtained a passkey from the manager. "Officer Ber-
man unlocked and opened the door, proceeding quietly, he testified, in
order to prevent the destruction of evidence .... ,,211 The officers found
both defendants and also marijuana in the apartment. A plurality 297 of
be reasonable under the circumstances as they appear to him." State v. Watson, 19 N.C. App.
160, 166, 198 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1973).
2'Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958).
-374 U.S. 23 (1963).
211d. at 37-38. The dissenting justices explcitly held that "the Fourth Amendment is violated




"'Id. at 28. See also State v. Watson, 19 N.C. App. 160, 166, 198 S.E.2d 185, 188-89 (1973).
In Ker as in Watson the officers were worried that the narcotics would be flushed down toilets.
The concern or narcotics officers with bathroom disposal of contraband led political humor col-
umnist Art Buchwald to propose "that the 'no-knock' law be stricken from the books and replaced
with a 'no-flush' law"; flushing a toilet during a raid would constitute prima-facie evidence or guilt.
Washingtin Post, Nov. 24, 1970, § B at I, col. I.
27On this issue, Justice Clark wrote a plurality opinion, in which Justices Black, Stewart and
White joined. Justice Harlan wrote a separate concurring opinion. A dissenting opinion was filed




the Supreme Court held that the exigent circumstances in this case
created an exception to the notice requirement.
2
1
Here justification for the officers' failure to give notice is uniquely
present. In addition to the officers' belief that Ker was in possession
of narcotics, which could be quickly and easily destroyed, Ker's furtive
conduct in eluding them shortly before the arrest was ground for the
belief that he might well have been expecting the police.
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The Court therefore approved as a sufficient reason for dispensing
with the notice requirement a reasonable concern for the destruction of
evidence. Moreover, the Court necessarily held that a police officer may
rely on this reason without prior judicial approval, at least where he is
undertaking a warrantless arrest or search.
While the plurality was content merely to approve this reason for
not giving notice, the dissenters described three circumstances in which
an unannounced police intrusion into a private home would win their
approval and said that the courts should refuse to recognize exceptions
in other situations. 0 Their list of three is as follows:
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority
and purpose,30' or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief that
persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where those
within, made aware of the presence of someone outside (because, for
example, there has been a knock at the door), are then engaged in
activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an escape or the
destruction of evidence is being attempted.
3 2
Common to both opinions was an acceptance of a reasonably per-
374 U.S. at 39-41.
"Id. at 40. In a footnote the plurality acknowledged that:
[a] search of the record with the aid of hindsight may lend some support to the conclu-
sion that, contra the reasonable belief of the officers, petitioners may not have been
prepared for an imminent visit from the police. It goes without saying that in determin-
ing the lawfulness of entry and the existence of probable cause we may concern ourselves.
only with what the officers had reason to believe at the time of their entry.
I. at 40-41 n.12.
'Id. at 55.
I"'Some federal courts have developed a practical view of the "useless gesture" exception to
excuse the failure of officers to announce their purpose when they have announced their identity
in circumstances suggesting that their purpose is known. See United States v. Wylie, 462 F.2d 1178,
1186, 1188-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1034 (3d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Singleton, 439 F.2d 381, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1971); Bosley v. United States, 426 F.2d 1257,
1263 (D.C. Cir. 1970). But see United States ex rel. Ametrane v. Gable, 401 F.2d 765, 766 (3d
Cir. 1968).
a"-374 U.S. at 47. The dissenters elaborated as follows: "[l]n the absence of a showing of
awareness by the occupants of the officers' presence and purpose, 'loud noises' or 'running' within
would amount, ordinarily, at least, only to ambiguous conduct." Id. at 57.
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ceived need to protect against the destruction of evidence as a sufficient
reason for "no-knock." The opinions diverged only on the basis of the
standard for establishing that need." 3 Significantly, neither opinion
was satisfied that notice could be automatically dispensed with just
because marijuana-readily disposable contraband-was the object of
the search. 04 Both required additional evidence. The plurality accepted
evidence of a possibly routine maneuver to elude anyone who might be
following even though engaged in at a place remote from the apartment
to be searched. Applying a stricter proof standard, the dissent demanded
at least a reasonable basis to believe that the persons within the apart-
ment had knowledge of the presence of someone outside, and were either
aware of the authority and purpose of those outside or were seen or
heard by the officers to be engaging in activity capable of accomplishing
the destruction of the evidence.
Current North Carolina law is consistent with the basic common
law and constitutonal rule that
[o]rdinarily, a police officer, absent invitation or perinission, may not
enter a private home to make an arrest or otherwise seize a person
unless he first gives notice of his authority and purpose and makes a
demand for and is refused entry. Without special or emergency circum-
stanes, an entry by an officer which does not comply with these re-
quirements is illegal." 5
This principle applies to entries to conduct a search as well as to effect
an arrest. 306 It apparently does not apply to entry through an open
door 37 although the court of appeals has accepted the federal rule "that
the question of whether there was an actual breaking of the door is not
determinative of the issue." 38 North Carolina cases have implied that
one reason that might justify an unannounced intrusion is to prevent the
escape of a suspect," 9 but they have made clear that this reason can
"0See Note, 80 YALE L.J., supra note 279, at 148.
30'See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38, 61-62 (1963).
'State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 512 173 S.E.2d 897, 905 (1970), cerl. denied, 403 U.S.
940 (1971). The decision was based primarily on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-44 (1965), which author-
izes forcible entry to make an arrest for a felony or other dangerous crime "admittance having
been demanded and denied."
'O'State v. Howard, 274 N.C. 188, 202, 162 S.E.2d 495, 505-06 (1968); State v. Heckstall,
268 N.C. 208, 209, 150 S.E.2d 213, 214-15 (1966); State v. Shue, 16 N.C. App. 696, 701, 193
S.E.2d 481, 484-85 (1972): cf Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306 (1958).
"7State v. Howard, 274 N.C. 188, 202, 162 S.E.2d 495.
3"State v. Turnbull, 16 N.C. App. 542, 544, 192 S.E.2d 689, 691 (1972).
"State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 512, 173 S.E,2d 897, 905 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
940 (1971): State v. Covington, 273 N.C. 690, 697, 161 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1968).
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only be used if there is particular information establishing a risk that
notice would prompt an escape that could not easily be thwarted by the
officers.:"" A recent court of appeals opinion stated that the notice
requirement may be excused "under special and emergency conditions
when it reasonably appears that such an announcement and demand by
the officer and the delay consequent thereto would provoke the escape
of the suspect, place the officer in peril, or cause the destruction of [sic]
disposition of critical evidence. ' 3 1' North Carolina recognizes that
where notice would be a useless gesture because the circumstances war-
rant a belief that the occupants of the house already know the authority
and purpose of the officers, an entry may be made without giving notice.
Thus sometimes lack of notice of authority and purpose is forgiven if
there is at least notice by the officers of their presence and a demand
for entry.:'
12
The Commission's proposal in this regard is contained in proposed
sections 15A-249 and 15A-251 :
313
Except as provided in G.S. § 15A-250, an officer executing a
search warrant 3t4 must, before entering the premises, give appropriate
notice of his identity and purpose to the person to be searched, or the
person in apparent control of the premises to be searched. If it is
unclear whether anyone is present at the premises to be searched, he
must give notice in a manner likely to be heard by anyone who is
present .
3 1
t State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C. 499, 512, 173 S.E.2d 897, 905 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S.
940 (1971): State v. Covington, 273 N.C. 690, 697, 161 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1968).
'"State v. Watson, 19 N.C. App. 160, 165, 198 S.E.2d 185, 188 (1973).
'"State v. Hoffman, 281 N.C. 727, 730-31, 736, 190 S.E.2d 842, 845-46, 848 (1972); State v.
Harvey, 281 N.C. I, II, 187 S.E.2d 706, 713 (1972); State v. Shue, 16 N.C. App. 696, 701, 193
S.E.2d 481, 484-85 (1972); State v. Basden, 8 N.C. App. 401, 406, 174 S.E.2d 613, 616 (1970). In
State v. Turnhull, 16 N.C. App. 542, 545, 192 S.E.2d 689, 692 (1972), the court of appeals upheld
a search in which the officer identified himself and his authority as he stepped into the house
through a slightly ajar door. The court ruled that the trial court's findings supported the validity
of the search but did not say what those findings were. See also State v. Watson. 19 N.C. App.
160, 198 S.E.2d 185 (1973).
"'The recommendation of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure is stated in less
specilic terms. It would authorize dispensing with the notice requirement if compliance "would
endanger the successful execution of the warrant with all practicable safety." MODEL CODE § SS
220.3(2), (3).
'"No provision is made for a notice requirement in the case of warrantless searches. Undoubt-
edly that omission represents a judgment by the Commission that all such searches may be lawfully
conducted only under exigent circumstances when the subjects of the search will likely be aware
of the authority and purpose of the officers as a result of the facts creating the exigency, and that
such searches will rarely involve an entry into a building. Bul see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963). State v. Covington, 273 N.C. 690, 697, 161 S.E.2d 140, 145 (1968).
"'Because this language may be misunderstood as authorizing an unannounced entry if the
1973]
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An officer may execute a search warrant without the prior notice
required by G.S. § 15A-249 if:
(1) The officer has probable cause to believe that the notice
required by G.S. § 15A-249 would endanger the life or safety of any
person; or
(2) An order authorizing execution without notice has been ob-
tained from any judge."6 The application by any officer for such an
order must include a statement of facts establishing probable cause to
believe that the notice required by G.S. § 15A-249 is likely to endanger
the life or safety of any person or the notice required by G.S. § 15A-
249 is likely to result in the disposal of items subject to seizure. If the
judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that either of these
conditions is met, he may issue an order permitting execution of the
warrant without notice. The fact that the items subject to seizure are
easily destructible or disposable does not in itself constitute an inde-
pendently sufficient basis for concluding that there is probable cause
to believe that the giving of notice will result in destruction or disposal.
The order permitting execution without notice and the application for
such order must be attached to the search warrant, and copies of the
order and application must be attached to all copies of the search
warrant and warrant application.317
ollicer believes the premises are unoccupied, it should be clarified, perhaps by striking the words,
"If it is unclear whether anyone is present at the premises to be searched . i...-f the premises
are in Fact empty, none of the reasons for dispening with notice are present. Therefore the officer
should announce his authority and purpose in case he is mistaken and someone is inside the
premises to be searched.
"'Proposed § 15A-243, basically paralleling existing law as established in N.C, GEN.
STAT. § 15-25(a) (Supp. 1971) and N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-180, -181, -273, -291 (1969), provides
that the following officials may issue search warrants: a Justice of the Supreme Court (warrant
valid throughout the state); a judge of the court of appeals or of the superior court (warrant valid
throughout the state): a judge of the district court (warrant valid throughout the district). a clerk
(warrant valid throughout the county); and a magistrate (warrant valid throughout the county).
By contrast, only a "judge" may issue an order permitting execution of a warrant without notice.
Proposed § 15A-250(2). The Commission explained that "[t]his provision is designed to prevent
such requests from becoming part of standard form warrant applications." CoMMENTs 197.
In Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), the United States Supreme Court upheld
the authority of municipal clerks employed by the judicial branch of the city government to issue
arrest warrants for persons charged with ordinance violations. The Court held that an issuing
ollicial "must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached and he must be capable of
determining whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search." Id. at 350. The
warrant authority need not reside exclusively in a lawyer or a judge. Id. at 349. But, "it requires
severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement." Id. at 350.
The recommendation of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure would not require
advance judicial approval in any case. MODEL CODE § SS 220.3(2), (3).
"'Proposed §§ 15A-249, -250. Proposed § 15A-251 then provides:
An officer may break and enter any premises or vehicle when necessary to the
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This proposal was the subject of newspaper editorial controversy when
he Commission's proposals were publicly released.3 18 The controversy
has been highly exaggerated, probably because the subject has been
widely misunderstood and because of the national controversy that at-
tended the "no-knock" provisions in the District of Columbia Court
Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 197011 and the Federal Con-
trolled Substances Act of 1970.320
"No-knock" does not alter the basic search and seizure law defin-
ing the constitutionally required circumstances in which a police intru-
sion upon a person's reasonable expectation of privacy may be author-
execution of the warrant if:
(I) The oflicer has previously announced his identity and purpose as required
by G.S. 15A-249 and reasonably believes either that admittance is being denied
or unreasonably delayed or that the premises or vehicle is unoccupied; or
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the giving of notice would
endanger the life or safety of any person; or
(3) An order has been obtained pursuant to G.S. 15A-250 permitting execution
of the search warrant without notice.
The Commission's proposal therefore requires notice in advance of entry regardless of whether
the entry requires a breaking or the use of force. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
federal statutes requiring notice to apply even if the officers only open a closed but unlocked door,
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 586, 589, 590 (1968), or force open a chain lock on a
partially open door. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 303, 313 (1958). On the other hand, an
ollicer obtaining entry by ruse may not be required to announce his authority and purpose. Sabbath
v. United States, supra at 590 n.7; United States v. Beale, 445 F.2d 977, 978 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1026 (1972) (After a hotel manager, at the request of police officers, knocked on
the defendant's door and announced only his own presence, the defendant opened the door and
the ollicers entered and arrested him.); United States v. Syler, 430 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1970) (At
the door of the defendant's house, an officer called out "gas man" and, as the defendant began to
open the door, pulled the door open and entered); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir.
1969) (Ollicers asked a hotel manager to announce a call for the girl sharing a room with the
defendant, and when she opened the door, the officers immediately entered and arrested the
defendant). These decisions suggest that a requirement that the officers give notice of their author-
ity and purpose is not violated if they give notice of a false identity and suggest a false purpose.
While the ruse might mitigate the potential for violence, in some circumstances, Chief Judge Tuttle
argued in dissent in Beale that such use of deceit is inconsistent with the reverence for privacy which
is the basic principle of the fourth amendment. United States v. Beale, supra at 978-79. In Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Supreme Court held that flight of the suspect did
not justify an unannounced entry in the ambiguous circumstances of that case: "Agent Wong did
eventually disclose that he was a narcotics officer. However, he affirmatively misrepresented his
mission at the outset, by stating that he had come for laundry and dry cleaning. And before Toy
fled the ollicer never adequately dispelled the misimpression engendered by his own ruse." Id. at
482-83.
3"Charlotte Observer, Feb. 8, 1973, § A at 18, col. I; Greensboro Daily News, Feb. 6,
1973. § A at 6, col. I; News & Observer, Feb. 6, 1973, at 4, col. I.
"'D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-591 (1973).
--21 U.S.C. § 879(b) (1970).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ized. It only provides that under certain conditions a law enforcement
officer, who is otherwise lawfully entitled to embark upon such an intru-
sion, may do so without giving advance notice of his authority or pur-
pose. Thus, it does not serve as an independent basis for an invasion of
privacy; it does not excuse a failure of probable cause or justify the
absence of a warrant. It operates only with regard to the method of
entry when the right to enter is established under other principles.
The discussion of "no-knock" authority should focus on the nature
of the exceptions to the notice requirement and the standard of accepta-
ble evidence to support a conclusion that an exceptional circumstance
is present. The Commission's proposal requires notice of identity and
purpose before execution of a search warrant except in two situations:
one, when the notice might endanger the life of the officer or some other
person, and, two, when the notice might result in the destruction or
disposal of evidence. The notice may be dispensed with if a judge finds
"probable cause" that either situation "is likely". Such a determination
would be based upon an application including a statement of facts filed
by an officer. Notice may be dispensed with without prior judicial ap-
proval only if an officer has probable cause that notice would endanger
life or safety. Unless a judge so orders, no provision is made for an
officer to dispsense with the notice requirement on the ground that
compliance is likely to alert the suspect to destruction or disposal of the
evidence. In this regard the Commission's proposal considerably re-
stricts the circumstances under which "no-knock" may be justified for
the purpose of preventing the destruction of evidence from that which
has been permitted in other jurisdictions. The possibility of "no-knock"
being utilized by police officers because they hear scurrying or flushing
noises on approaching a house is thereby eliminated. Such noises are
ordinarily ambiguous without a showing that the occupants are aware
that police officers lurk outside, a showing best accomplished by their
giving notice to that effect.-2'
In addition the proposal avoids the controversial aspect of the
federal laws. Those laws provide for advance judicial authorization of
a "no-knock" without limits on the quality of evidence on which the
judge must base his decision. They are arguably subject to an interpreta-
tion that they authorize forcible, unannounced entries on a blanket basis
in all cases in which the evidence is of a kind that is readily disposable,
-t'Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 56, 60-61 (1963) (dissenting opinion); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 482 (1963): Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301. 311 (1958).
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for example, in all narcotics or gambling offenses. The Commission
would prohibit that practice. Its proposal specifies that the officer may
not ask a judge to issue a "no-knock" order in anticipation that notice
might stimulate destruction activity simply because the evidence sought
is readily destructible. More specific evidence is required, and the Com-
mission in its report suggested as examples of such evidence "informa-
tion that quickly disposable 'flash' paper is being used in a particular
gambling operation, or that specific plans have been made for quick
disposal of narcotics."3 ' As the California Supreme Court has ex-
plained:
Under the FourthAmendment, a specific showing must always be
made to justify any police action tending to disturb the security of the
people in their homes. Unannounced forcible entry is in itself a serious
disturbance of that security and cannot be justified on a blanket basis.
Otherwise the constitutional test of reasonableness would turn only on
practical expediency, and the amendment's primary safeguard-the
requirement of particularity-would be lost. Just as the police must
have sufficient particular reason to enter at all, so must they have some
particular reason to enter in the manner chosen. 3 3
Although the Commission's proposal is narrowly drawn, the North
"'2COMMENTS 197. in People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304
(1973). the California Supreme Court upheld an unannounced entry to serve a search warrant based
on a reliable informer's warning "that defendant possessed several firearms in his apartment and
that he inavirably answered the door with a loaded gun in his hand." Id. at -, 512 P.2d at 1212,
109 Cal. Rptr. at 308. In Parsley v. Superior Court, - Cal. 3d -, 513 P.2d 611, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 563 (1973), that court interpreted its no-knock statute to forbid advance judicial authoriza-
tion of unannounced entries. The court said:
While a search warrant must necessarily rest upon previously obtained information,
unannounced entry is excused only on the basis of exigent circumstances existing at the
time an ollicer approaches a site to make an arrest or execute a warrant. Facts existing
at the time of obtaining a warrant may no longer exist at the time of entry. Such an
emergency, therefore, can be judged only in light of circumstances of which the officer
is aware at the latter moment. Previously obtained information may at that time be
taken into account in determining the necessity of dispensing with ordinary announce-
ments ...but a more significant factor in this decision is perception and knowledge
the officer acquires on the scene immediately prior to effecting entry.
Id. at -, 513 P.2d at 614, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 566. A dissenting justice argued that that reasoning
"is equally true of the facts justifying issuance of the warrant itself as it is of the facts justifying
excusal of the announcement requirement." Id. at _ 513 P.2d at 617, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 569.
'21eople v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 588-89, 432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12, (1967).
See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960); Meyer v. United States, 386 F.2d 715,
718 (9th Cir. 1967).
The United States Supreme Court has said: "This demand for specificity in the information
upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968).
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Carolina Police Executives Association would like it to be narrower
still. The Association has advised the legislature that the "'preventing
destruction of evidence' exception . . . is inherently dangerous and be-
yond our immediate needs in all but the most extreme situations.
'31
It therefore recommended that police officers be permitted to enter
unannounced only when "immediate entry is necessary to prevent dan-
ger to life,":' 2-1 defined as existing in two situations: when "(I) [a] crimi-
nal offense jeopardizing the life or safety of any person is being commit-
ted on the premises; or (2) [t]he givingof such notice of authority and
demand of entry would jeopardize the life and safety of the officer."
21
Because of that police assessment of the situation in North Carolina,
the Commission's proposal for allowing a "destruction of evidence"
exception would incur serious dangers without serving any purpose. For
that reason, it should be deleted. The rest of the proposal, however,
permitting an unannounced entry when notice would provoke rather
than prevent danger to life, deserves to be retained with the addition of
a specificity proviso.
-'LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM OF THE NORTH CAROLINA POLICE EXECUTIVES ASSOCIATION 4
(1972).
325/d.
2' ld. at 12.
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